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I.
WHIE THE Anglo-American and the Continental legal systems have
the same rules with respect to the effects of a forgery of the drawer's
signature,1 there is a striking difference between them in their attitude
toward a forged indorsement. - Under the Uniform Codes on Bills of Ex-
change and Checks, which were drafted in Geneva in 1931 and 1932 and
have been adopted in most of the civil law countries, a holder acquiring an
instrument in good faith and without gross negligence by an uninterrupted
series of indorsements has good title even in a case where the instrument
tLecturer in Law, Yale Law School.
1. BILs OF EXcHANGE Acr, § 53; NEGomrrLE IusTRuiENzs LAw, § 62; G.vA
BILs OF ExcnAxGE Acr, art. 7; GEN.VA CnrmC Acr, art 10. The rule common to
both legal systems which makes a drawee who has accepted a bill to which the drawer's
signature has been forged liable to a bona fide indorsee and which denies him the re-
covery of his payment can be found very early in DuPUIs Dz L& SEnnA, L'Ar r-s
Larnazs DE CHANGE SUIVANT L'USAGE DES PLUS CtjLsans PLAc S. Dz z!Etrorz (1693),
c. 2, no. 22, 23. See further, 1 GRUENHur, VEcHSEmncCT (1897) 162 ct seq., 224, n. 1.
For the classical presentation of the rule, see Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354 (1762);
2 GRUENHUr, supra, at 14. Only the protection accorded a purchaser who bought the
instrument in reliance on the acceptance is explained by the usual rationalization of
the rule, i.e., that the indorsee cannot.be supposed to discover a forgery of the drawer's
signature if such forgery has escaped the drawee-acceptor who, because of his business
relations with the drawer, has a basis for examining the genuineness of the drawer's
signature. But the rationalization fails to explain why a bona fide purchaser who
procures himself the acceptance or receives payment is also protected. An argument
for this extended protection could be found in former days when the drawing of a
bill of exchange was accompanied by a letter from the drawer to the drawee advising
the latter of the drawing. If the drawee accepted or paid without having received
this confirmatory letter, there was some ground for treating him like a drawee who
accepted without having sufficient funds of the drawer. But today, when such con-
firmatory letters are usually no longer employed in inland transactions, the broad
application of the Price v. Neal rule, which is an outgrowth of a different business
practice, is difficult to explain as a matter of policy. For an explanation of Price v.
Neal on the legalistic level, see Ames, The Doctrine of Price v. Neal (1891) 4 HAnv.
L. REv. 297 at 890; KxEER, QuAsi CoNTAcs (1893) 154 e seq.
2. Hudson and Feller, The Intenational Unification of Laws concerning Bills of
Exchange (1930) 44 HARv. I. REv. 333.
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was lost or stolen and one of the signatures forged." As a corollary to
this rule, the drawee is bound only to examine the external regularity
of the chain of indorsements and is discharged if he pays in good faith
to a holder who can establish his title by an uninterrupted series of in-
dorsements.4 The Anglo-American law, on the other hand, provides
generally that a forged signature in an indorsement is wholly inoperative, 5
although the English Bills of Exchange Act makes an exception to this
rule in favor of the drawee-banker in regard to checks and other demand
drafts.'
The Geneva conventions have made a clear-cut distinction between the
Continental and Anglo-American rule. But in the early European history
of these legal systems, there was no disagreement on the effect of a
forged indorsement. It was only with the change of the Continental
attitude towards the close of the 18th century that a gradual divergence
of views began.'
The problems presented by forged indorsements have accompanied
the development of the indorsement as a means to transfer bills of ex-
change.' Indorsements made their first appearance in Italy at the close
of the sixteenth century but were little used there throughout the seven-
teenth century.' In France indorsements appear first about 1620, and
their use grew rapidly ;o from there they were imported into the other
European countries, 1 including England where they appear before 1650.
Malynes in his famous Lex Mercatoria (1622) does not mention them,12
3. GENEVA BILLS OF EXCHANGE Acr, art. 16(2); GENEVA CHECK Acr, art. 21;
Hudson and Feller, loc. cit. supra note 2
4. GENEVA BILLS OF EXCHANGE ACr, art. 40; GENEVA CUECK ACT, art. 35.
5. BILLS OF EXCHANGE AcT, § 24; NEC,0IABLE INSTRUmENTS LAW, § 23.
6. BILLS OF EXCHANGE ACT, § 60.
7. As to the continental origin of the Anglo-American law of negotiable instru-
ments, see 8 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1937) 146, 151; 2 STREET,
FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL. LIALIr (1906) 359.
8. The early history of the indorsement is still obscure. See SCHAPS, Zun
GEsCHICHTE DES WECHSELINDOSSAMENTS (1892); 1 GRUENHUT, Op. cit. supra note 1,
at 87 et seq.
9. BiENER, WECHSELRECHTLICHE ABHANDLUNGEN (1859) 139 el $eq.; 1 GRuENZnuT,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 88, n. 6. But see GoLDscHMIDr, UN VERSALGESCHxCnTE DES
HANDELSECHTS (1891) 451.
10. SAvARY, PARnARs 80, 82 (1688), 2 LE PARFAIT NAGoCIANT (1715) 588, 602;
1 GRUENHUT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 87, n. 2; LEvy-BRUHL, HisroInR DE LA ixrn
DE CHANGE EN FRANCE AU 17ItmE Fr 18IEME SIACLES (1933) 103 et seq. Up to this
time bills of exchange were only transferable in a limited way, i.e., by giving the
transferee a power of attorney to collect the bill. See further, BRUNNER, Das Fran-
ziesische Inhaberpapier des Mittelalters (1879) in 1 AZrANDLUNGEN, 487 et seq.
11. 8 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 155; KUNTZE, WECHSELRECHT in 4 ENDE-
MANN, HANDBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN HANDELS See UND WECHSELRECI1TS (1884) 23
et seq.
12. Neither does ROBERTS, THE MERCHANT'S MAP OF COMMERCE (1st. ed. 1638,
2d. ed. 1671). The first statutory provision mentioning indorsements in Great Britain
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but Marius in his equally influential Advice Concerning Bills, first pub-
lished in 1651, deals with them extensively, giving many illustrations of
indorsements. 13
Since forgeries were quite frequent in the seventeenth century,14 it is not
surprising that statutes of the time attempted to protect innocent parties
against such danger. Thus, as early as 1607 there was a statute in Naples
prohibiting more than one indorsement and requiring the signature of the
indorser-the payee-to be authenticated by a notary public."r  The pur-
pose of this provision was to safeguard the acceptor or drawee against
the danger of a payment to a holder claiming under an indorsement to
which the signature of the payee was forged,10 for such a payment did
not discharge the acceptor's or drawee's obligation. The contemporary
legal literature regarded an indorsee either as the agent of the indorser
or (later) as the latter's assignee.' He could, therefore, according to
the seventeenth century writers, acquire no greater rights than those had
by his indorser,"8 and only an indorsement coming from the true owner
could transfer title." A forged indorsement, on the other hand, could
not deprive the true owner of his rights. As a consequence, the acceptor
who paid to the holder under a forged indorsement had to pay again to
the true owner, at the time the forgery was committed, of the instrument,
and a drawee could not debit the drawer with the amount of such a pay-
ment. A very clear statement of the law to this effect can be found in
Savary's famous Parfait Nigociaat" which appeared first in 1675 and
was translated into nearly all the European languages.
The first reported case dealing with the effect of a forged indorsement,
a French decision of 1755, used the then conventional arguments to defeat
is a Scottish act of 1681. It established a summary procedure for foreign bills and for
their registration with the court "at the instance of the person to whom the same is
made payable or his order, either against the drawer or indorser, in case of protest
for non acceptance or against the acceptor in case of protest for non payment." GLInt,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BILLS OF ExcHANGE, PEnomissory NoTEs A=n L-rrms or
CREDIT w SaMLAND (2d ed. 1824) 265.
13. 8 HoLDsWoRTH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 156, n. 1. Marius, however, uses the
term "assignment" instead of "indorsement"
14. LEvY-BRuEL, op. cit. supra note 10, at 215.
15. PRAGMATICA III DE LrTEnIs cAi3Xr, Nov. 8, 1607, art. 14; PInA,.AicA V.
of July 9, 1617, art. 5; &RrmTENS, USPRUNG DES AVECrsEMEcnTs (1797) AzxuM 77.
16. 1 GRuENHuT, op. cit, supra note 1, at 88, n. 6; TnrrTscuKE 1 ENzIzviuoprMI
DES WECHSELRECHTS 508.
17. LEVY-BRuHL, op. cit. su pra note 10, at 214; ScrAPs, op. Cit. Supra note 8, at 97
et seq.; 8 HoLswoRTH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 142.
18. "Le porteur est subrog6 e tous les droits, nonts, raisons et actions de son
indosseur et cest pourquoi il les exerce sur l'indosseur dc son dit indossour et contre
le tireur." SAvARY, PARERE 16 (1682).
19. 1 PARDEssus, TAu-TE DU CONTAT Er DES LETTEs DC Cumiuo- no. 299 (1809).
20. SAvARY, 1 PAnrF1r NfcorxT (1736) 258; DuPUIs DE LA SERRA, op. cit. upra
note 1, c. 13, nos. 1-11, 13-15.
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a bona fide purchaser's claim on the instrument.21 Here the forgers,
who had been entrusted by the payee to procure the drawee's acceptance,
obtained the acceptance, forged an indorsement of the payee to them-
selves, indorsed the instrument, and then sold it with the help of a note-
broker to a bona fide purchaser. Claiming that the instrument ought to
be treated "like a coin in their pocket," the bona fide purchaser pleaded
that the indorsement to him was genuine and not a forgery, that he had
acquired the bill not from a stranger but from a well-known note broker,
and that he had no reason to suspect that the indorsement of the real
owner was a forgery. But the court, relying upon the old dogma in-
voked by the plaintiff-payee, decreed that the title was still in the payee
and that the acceptor had to pay him and not the bona fide purchaser.
About twenty years later, Lord Mansfield decided the first reported
English forged indorsement case in the same way. 2 The defendant
buyer had accepted a bill of exchange, drawn on him by the seller's servant
for the price of merchandise, and had paid it to an indorsee who held
the instrument under a forged indorsement of the vendor-payee. When
sued by the assignees in bankruptcy of the seller for goods sold and
delivered, the defendant pleaded this payment. Lord Mansfield gave
judgment for the plaintiff. Distinguishing the case at bar from that of
a lost bearer instrument, he held that "he that takes a forged bill must
abide by the consequences, for the man whose name is forged knows
nothing of it . . . It [the instrument] could not be paid without their
[the payees'] hand, and defendant has been negligent in inquiring whether
it was their hand or not." In Smith v. Chester (1787), the plaintiff in-
dorsee who sued the acceptor was non-suited because he was unable to
prove the handwriting of the first indorser.23 The court did not follow
the plaintiff's argument that, since the indorsements under which the
plaintiff claimed wei-e present at the time of the acceptance, the defendant
could not afterwards dispute them, and that in the case of foreign bills a
requirement of proof of the indorser's handwriting would work great
hardship.
Mead v. Young (1790), generally considered the leading English case
on the subject of forged indorsements, concerned a bill payable to Henry
Davis or order which was sent by the mail from Dunkerk to London
and came into the hands of another Henry Davis who offered it to the
plaintiff.24 Before discounting the bill from Davis, who was a stranger,
21. DNsART, 3 COLLECTION DES Dk-sIoNs NouvELLEs (1771) 131 vo. lelire de
change. In accord is decision of February, 1761, cited in RoaUE, JURISPRUDENCE CON-
SULAR E 349.
22. Aaron Smith and another, assignees of Bagnall and Hand v. Shepperd, Hil. T.
16 Geo. III, cited in Cmrr, BILLS Or EXCHANGE (1st ed. 1799) 126, n. 4.
23. 1 T. R. 654 (1787).
24. 4 T. R. 28 (1790); see further, Gibson v. Minet 1 H. BI. 569 (1791).
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the plaintiff, upon inquiry, was assured by the defendant, who had ac-
cepted the instrument at the request of Davis, that it was his acceptance
and a good bill. The defendant acceptor offered evidence to show that
the Henry Davis who indorsed the bill was not the person in whose favor
it was drawn. The majority of the court held that unless the indorsement
was by the person to whom the bill was really payable, it was a forgery
and could confer no title. The most interesting aspect of the case is that
the judges did not confine themselves to the conventional legal argu-
ments, but talked for the first time in practical terms and weighed the
interests of an indorsee against those of the other parties. The policy
arguments advanced are indicated in the contrasting views of Buller, J.
and Chief Justice Kenyon. According to the former the plaintiff who
cannot recover on the bill
"will proceed against the forger and that would be the case, even
if the instrument had passed through several hands, because each
indorser would trace it up to the person from whom he had received
it, and at last it would come to him who had been guilty of the for-
gery, whereas if the plaintiff succeeded in this action, he'will have no
inducement to prosecute for the forgery. The drawer, on whom the
loss would in that case fall, might have no means of discovering the
person who committed the forgery, and then he could probably es-
cape punishment. As far, therefore, as convenience can have any
effect, it weighs strongly with me to receive the evidence. But, at
all events, plaintiff cannot recover, since he derives his title under
a forged indorsement."
Chief Justice Kenyon, on the other hand, thought it was the drawer's
fault
"in not describing more particularly the person to whom he intended
it should be paid. Plaintiff was not bound to send to Dunkerk to
know whether the person who had possession of the bill was or was
not the real H. Davis. There may be, however, some inconvenience
the other way; but setting this inconvenience on the one side against
that on the other, in my opinion it would throw too great a burden
on persons taking bills of exchange to require proof of an indorser
that the person from whom he received the bill was the real payee.
Such proof has never yet been required of an indorsee in such an
action and, therefore, I think, as there was no fraud or want of due
diligence on the part of the plaintiff, he is entitled to recover."
The rule given us by these leading English cases, that even a bona
fide purchaser can acquire no title under or through a forged indorse-
ment and that a bona fide payment of an instrument tainted with such
forgery does not bar a subsequent action by the true owner against an
acceptor or prior parties, has been followed by the courts both in England
19381 867
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and in this country25 and has been incorporated in the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law, and with some qualifications, in the Bills of Exchange Act.20
It has assumed, moreover, a great practical importance because of the
broad application by the courts of the term, forged indorsement. As
Mead v. Young and the cases following its authority show, a forged
indorsement is present not only where the transferor's real name is differ-
ent from the name under which he indorses but also where he bears
the same name but has no actual title to the instrument. Furthermore,
according to many courts, an unauthorized indorsement by an agent,
unless he is acting within the scope of his general authority and is vio-
lating only special instructions, amounts to a forgery. This wide appli-
cation of the forgery doctrine has probably prevented some courts from
giving to bona fide purchasers the benefit of the apparent authority rule .2
On the other hand, the forgery concept has received some limitations,
as we shall see, in the imposter and fictitious payee situations. 8 The
policy behind the Anglo-American law is, as the line of cases sired by
Mead v. Yocng clearly indicates, to put the loss on the person who bought
from the forger. This rule, evolved out of cases with rather simple sets
of facts, has survived till now and has been applied over and over again,
and we shall see, to complex present day situations. In applying the rule
that no purchaser can take title under a forged endorsement, the courts
apparently still feel that the equities in favor of the owner at the time
of forgery are superior to those of a purchaser from a forger, the business
philosophy being that one should buy negotiable paper only from a person
in whose integrity one can trust. But the negligent mailing and imposter
cases reveal a tendency to break away from the rule and to recognize
that there are situations in which the equities of the purchaser are superior.
As opposed to the English history of the rule of forged indorsements,
there began on the continent in the middle of the eighteenth century a
gradual breaking away from the traditional doctrine. The attacks on
the old dogma concentrated first on the rule which denied protection to
the bona fide payor. It was pointed out that when the old rule was carried
out consistently, the drawee (acceptor) was forced to assure himself
not only of the title of the presentor but also that of all the latter's
predecessors; and this put too heavy a burden on a conscientious drawee,
particularly a banker, while enabling, on the other hand, a recalcitrant
debtor to gain time by demanding that the presentor verify indorsements
under which he claimed title. It was felt that this result would paralyze
completely the use of bills of exchange, the utility of which depended
25. CHI ry, op. cit. supra note 22, at 110, 123, 124.
26. BILLS OF EXCHANGE ACT, § 24; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, § 23.
27. Standard Steam Specialty Co. v. Corn Exchange Bank, 220 N. Y. 478, 116
N. E. 386 (1917).
28. Infra, p. 893.
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upon their prompt liquidation at maturity. The claim was also made
that since as a matter of business practice the holder could demand pay-
ment of the drawee without having to prove the genuineness of all prior
indorsements, a usage which had found approval by the courts, the payor,
as a counterbalance, needed protection against a double payment.' Under
the pressure of this criticism the Parlement de Paris, as early as 1787,
three years before Mead v. Young, regarded the acceptor who had made
a payment in good faith to an indorsee under a forged indorsement as
discharged." This rule was carried over into Article 145 of the French
Commercial Code of 1807 which provided for a presumptive discharge
of the person who pays at maturity, unless he has been notified not to
pay.3' A limited application of this rule was in turn incorporated into
the English Stamp Act of 1853,3 " and thence into Section 60 of the
Bills of Exchange Act.
The rule protecting the bona fide drawee or acceptor was the only
deviation from the traditional strict Continental theory in France until
1935, when she adopted, with the enactment of the Geneva Uniform
Laws, the German theory of giving protection to the bona fide indorsee
as well. Since the beginning of the eighteenth century German business
circles had severely criticized the old rule as being detrimental to com-
merce and its chief instrumentality, the bill of exchange. A transferee,
29. 1 P.Annssus, op. cit. supra note 19, nos. 294 et seq.; LEvY-BaunL, op. cit. supro
note 10, at 217 et seq. Acte de NotoriWt6 de la Conservaion de Lyon of z732, reported
in 3 DftisART (1751) 538 vo. ordre; Arr~t du Parcinent dc Filadres, of March 12,
1783, reported in ManLr , REs'xromz 281 rio. indorscment.
30. 3 DtrsArr, op. cit. supra note 21, at 597 r'o. indorsement.
31. NouGmi, Das LzrrRns DE CHANGE (4th ed. 1875) nos. 333-339.
32. 16 and 17 Vict. c. 59, § 19. The reasons for this change are succinctly stated
by Chief Justice Cockburn in Charles v. Blackwell (1877) 2 C P. D. 151, at 156:
"Now the purpose of the enactment we are dealing with v.-as, when cheques pay-
able to order were expected to become general, to protect bankers against the possibility
of forged indorsements . . . Against forgery of the writing of his own customers
the banker must be assumed to be capable of protecting himself. He is, or ought
to make himself acquainted with the signatures of his own customers. He cannot
be acquainted with the signatures of the multitude of payees or agents who may have
to indorse cheques drawn upon him and made payable to order. It was not unreason-
able, therefore, that while the customer obtained the advantage of being able to draw
cheques payable to order, the possibility of forged indorsements should be, as between
him and the banker, at his risk. By making a cheque payable to order, the drawer
obtained the advantage that if the cheque is stolen or lost before it reaches the payee,
it cannot be paid without a forged indorsement, the risk of which many persons, who
would not scruple to present a cheque payable to bearer, in fraud of the true owner,
and pocket the proceeds, might yet be unwilling to run. Furthermore, he obtains
through the indorsement of the payee an acknowledgment of the receipt of the cheque
and of its payment. Obtaining this benefit, it was but reasonable that the possibility
of a forged indorsement should be at his risk, or at all events be a question between
him and the payee, leaving the banker free from liability . . . "
19381
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it was said, could only be expected to examine the external regularity of
the chain of indorsement, and never did anything more when investi-
gating the title of his transferor; and it was demanded that this business
practice should be legalized to make it possible for bills of exchange to
circulate like money.3 3 The opponents of the old rule were partly suc-
cessful already in the Allgemeine Preussische Landrecht, and completely
in the later Allgemeine Deutsche Wechselordnung, 4 when they intro-
duced into this statute the doctrine that the chain of indorsements is not
interrupted by a forged one and that even the indorsee who buys from
the forger acquires a perfect title if he is not grossly negligent in mis-
taking the forger-indorser for the true owner."' Thus, by the middle of
the nineteenth century, the German law had gone the whole way in
breaking with the traditional view that an indorsee is his indorser's as-
signee. Under the new theory the title of a bona fide indorsee is not
in the least derivative, that is, dependent upon the previous indorser's
title, but is completely independent. If the indorsee is bona fide, i.e., not
grossly negligent, he always acquires title even if his predecessor had
none, provided there is an indorsement to him plus delivery. With the
title he acquires the rights incorporated in the instrument against all
prior parties whose promises are binding, irrespective of whether there
are non-binding promises in between, because the individual promises are
independent of each other. It was this German currency theory that was
taken over without much discussion into the Geneva Codes.
The essence of this solutipn reached in the civil law countries is said
to be as follows: the purported indorser is-subject to certain exceptions
-not liable to any subsequent purchaser, but he loses his "title" to the
instrument, that is, he cannot collect on the instrument if the acceptor
pays to a bona fide holder. The American rule is more favorable to the
purported indorser; he is neither liable to subsequent purchaser nor does
he lose his "title." But this description of the contrast is not entirely
accurate. A closer examination of the Continental system reveals that
the purported indorser is even less protected than it might at first ap-
pear. Since the subsequent purchaser acquires a valid title despite forgery
of a prior indorsement, he has a cause of action not only against the
acceptor, if there is one, but also, in case of dishonor, against all second-
ary parties, prior or subsequent to the forgery, with the exception of the
purported indorser. If, for example, the payee's signature has been
33. TRESCrrKE, HANDBUCH DES WECESELRECHTS (1824) §§236 et seq.; 2 THoE,
HANDELSRECHT (4th ed. 1878) 686 et seq.
34. PREussIscHEs LANDRECHT OF 1794, II 8 §§ 835, 1156, 1169; 1 GRUENHUT,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 226, n. 5; ALurEmEiNE DEUTSCHE WECHSELORDNUNG OF 1848,
art. 36, 74, 76.
35. 2 THoEL, loc. cit. supra note 33, at 693; THoEL, PRoToKoLLE DER L~rlztcER
WECHSELKONFERENZ (1866) 151.
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forged, the purchaser has a cause of action against the acceptor, or, in
case of dishonor, against the drawer. If the acceptor or the drawee pays
him, he can keep the proceeds. This payment entitles the drawee or
acceptor to debit the drawer's account, and the latter in turn will debit
the account of the payee. If, in case of dishonor, the drawer takes up the
instrument, he again can debit the payee's account. Thus, the payee,
although he is not directly liable on this purported indorsement to any
subsequent purchaser, indirectly has to pay for the instrument in the
situations mentioned above, so that only in cases where the acceptor and
drawer are insolvent does the non-liability of the payee on his purported
indorsement become of practical importance; where these parties are
solvent, the payee is ultimately charged.
To sum up: The old Continental tradition has been preserved up to
the present time in the Anglo-American system, in England, however,
with a qualification in favor of a bona fide banker. The Continental
systems, however, have broken away since the eighteenth century from
the rule they originated; some systems, like the French, departed only
gradually in favor of a bona fide payor; others, like the German, broke
radically from the old view. Finally, the German doctrine has been
adopted in all the civil law systems with the introduction of the Geneva
Codes so that nowadays the schism between the Anglo-American and
the Continental systems is complete. 0
II.
The continental rule, it has been shown, was quick to respond to
broad arguments of policy; while originally favoring the true owner
it gave way, first in Germany and later in the Geneva codes, before the
propaganda of business that the purchaser must be protected for the
good of commerce. The Anglo-American courts, on the other hand,
have been generally reticent to depart from the philosophy of the early
cases which placed the loss upon the recipient from the forger either
because he had taken negligently from a stranger or because he, and
not the purported endorser, was better fitted to pursue the forger; and
that philosophy has been articulated in the legal doctrine, first enun-
dated in Mead v. Young, that persons subsequent to the forged endorse-
ment can take no title to the instrument. But the rigidity of this rule
has been mitigated by recognizing that the true owner may be "pre-
cluded" from setting up the forgery of his signature. Therefore, before
any attempt can be made to determine in the abstract whether the Anglo-
American or the Continental is the better general rule, we must examine
the cases that have been decided under the American rule and its ex-
ceptions. The theory under which the exceptions are subsumed is, it
36. Hu'KA, DAS EINHEITLICHE WECHSELEHT (1934) 22 et seq.
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would seem, elastic enough to adapt the traditional rule to the equities
of each individual case. It could enable a court to decide every case by
weighing the comparative negligence of the respective parties. Lord
Mansfield had already seen the problem of the forged endorsement in
this light in the first reported English case on the problem:
"Each party is innocent (of the forgery crime); the question is,
on whom the loss must fall?-it should be on him who is most in
fault."8 7
The decision in other cases might be influenced by further equitable
considerations, ratification, estoppel, and the like, as well as by consider-
ations of commercial expediency. However, matters of policy, or con-
siderations of equity, have, in this country particularly, been slow to
overcome the rigor of the Anglo-American doctrine. Rather, an elab-
orate protection for the true owner, with exceptions in only a limited
number of instances, has been built upon a philosophy designed to
place ultimate liability upon the purchaser who took from the forger.
It might be well to indicate first the status of the various parties
affected by a forged indorsement under the Anglo-American rule before
examining the qualifications made upon it. The protection afforded the
true owner must necessarily affect the subsequent purchasers, drawee
and acceptor, and prior secondary parties. Furthermore, the protection
of the true owner naturally affects the relation of all those parties among
themselves; their relation inter se has to be adjusted to the extent of
the protection given to the owner. It is, therefore, not surprising that
we find in the Anglo-American law a system of rules and counter-rules
attuned to each other which has no counterpart in the modern Conti-
nental law.
Subsequent Purchasers. The hornbooks have it that no subsequent
purchaser, however bona fide, can acquire title to an instrument to which
an indorsement has been forged. This is not altogether true. It is
correct that he cannot enforce payment against an acceptor 8s nor, in case
of dishonor, against secondary parties prior to the forgery.89 Yet, the
37. Smith v. Shepperd, note 22, supra.
38. Mead v. Young, 4 T. R. 28 (1890) ; Biaus oF EXCHANGE Acr, § 24; NEUGomLE
INsThUmENTS LAw, § 23.
39. BmLs OF EXCHANGE ACT, § 24; NEGOmIAL INsTRUmENTS LAW, § 23. It
makes no difference whether the forgery has been committed by a stranger or by a
dishonest employee of the prior party. The efforts of purchasers to hold a prior party
or a purported endorser on a forgery committed by an agent on the basis of respondeat
superior have in general been without success. Manufacturers Bank v. Prudential
Insurance Company, 102 Misc. 339, 168 N. Y. Supp. 913 (Sup. Ct. 1918); Ocala Nat.
Farm Loan Ass'n v. Munroe and Chambliss Nat. Bank, 89 Fla. 242, 103 So. 609
(1925). But see Pyper v. Climer, 29 Ohio App. 486, 163 N. E. 640 (1928), (1929)
42 HAiv. L. REv. 949. Here the defendant-payee of a check gave it unlndorsed to
[Vol. 47: 863
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subsequent purchaser is not entirely out of luck; he has a cause of action
not only against the immediate transferor for the purchase price he has
paid4" but against all parties subsequent to the forgery for the face
amount of the bill, all such parties having breached the so-called implied
warranty of genuineness of the instrument."' The rights arising out
of the breach of these implied warranties are not, however, predicated
upon due presentment and timely notice of dishonor.4 They accrue im-
mediately upon transfer.43  Furthermore, since an indorsement is re-
garded as the drawing of a new bill, and since, therefore, the validity
of the indorsements of all the parties subsequent to the forgery is not
affected by the lack of liability to subsequent purchasers of the parties
prior to the forgery, the purchaser has despite a forged indorsement, in
case of dishonor, an additional remedy against any indorser subsequent
to the forgery for dishonor.44 Under this new-bill doctrine, the title to
an agent with instructions not to indorse it but to deposit it as security. Breaching
his instructions, the agent forged the defenckant's indorsement and transferred the
check to the plaintiff bona fide purchaser. The defendant was held to be precluded
from setting up the forgery defense.
40. Ritchie v. Summers, 3 Yeates 531 (Pa. 1803) ; Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany,
1 Hill 287 (N. Y. 1841) ; Terry v. Bissell, 26 Conn. 23 (1857). The rationale of these
cases is that the purchaser has not received the genuine indorsement he bargained and
paid for.
41. The right of the indorsee to sue his immediate indorser for the face amount
of the instrument on the implied warranty of genuineness of the instrument has been
generally recognized by American courts and has been incorporated into the Negotiable
Instruments Law, §§66, 65(l) and (2). Section 66 makes it clear that the purchaser
can sue every party subsequent to the forgery.
42. NEmoTLaBr_ INsTR EN-s LAW, § 66; Canal Bank v. Banl: of Albany, 1 Hill
287 (N. Y. 1841); Turnbull v. Bowyer, 40 N. Y. 456 (1869); Blethen v. Lovering,
58 Me. 437 (1870) semble; Ames, The Negotiable Instrumenis Law (1900) 14 HAnv.
L. REv. 241, 251.
43. Blethen v. Lovering, 58 Me. 437 (1870). This action for money had and
received accrues as soon as the seller-indorser is credited with the proceeds. Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta v. Atlanta Trust Co., 91 F. (2d) 23 (C. CA. 5th, 1937).
See (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 827.
44. Warren-Scharf Co. v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 97 Fed. 181 (C. C. A. 5th, 1899).
In this action no proof of prior signatures is required since the indorser varrantv
these. Brmiow, THE LAw OF BILLS, NorEs ANm CHECKS (3d ed. 1928) §493; ex
parte Clarke, 3 Bro. C. C. 238, ch. 1791 (1791) ; Lambert v. Pack, 1 Salk 127, (K. B.
1795) ; Critchlov v. Parry, 2 Camp. 182, N. P. 1809; McGregor v. Rhodes, 6 El. &
Bl. 266, (K. B. 1856); State Bank v. Freeman, 33 Mass. 535 (1835). This remedy
is quite distinct from that arising out of the vrarranty of genuineness. It is predicated
upon due presentment and notice of dishonor and is therefore probably not available
to a purchaser who has collected the proceeds. The remedy for breach of the warranty
of genuineness, on the other hand, is in such a case available to the purchaser since he
is not entitled to keep the proceeds. Furthermore, in order to use the remedy for
breach of the warranty of genuineness, the purchaser need not await maturity. Finally,
the cause of action against secondary parties for dishonor is not available to a holder
under a qualified indorsement such as a bank acting as collecting agent under indorse-
ment for collection.
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the instrument is split. The "true owner" retains his rights against all
prior parties and against the acceptor, while the subsequent purchaser
has recourse against all secondary parties subsequent to the forgery.
Most of the cases dealing with suits by the true owner against the
subsequent purchaser concern a purchaser who has collected the proceeds
of the instrument. 45 The recipient, it is uniformly held, has to pay to
the true owner the amount received from the drawee. The true owner
may sue the recipient in trover for conversion 46 or, waiving conversion,
in assumpsit for money had and received to his use.4 T Since the pur-
chaser has collected the money, the measure of recovery is the same
under either theory.48 And courts do not allow the defense that the
recipient has already paid the money he has received to a prior party,40
even in the case where the true owner sues for money had and received.
Many of the cases dealing with the recovery of the true owner against
the recipient involve suits by the payee of a mailed check who never
received it, but only a few cases consider the bearing of the absence of
delivery."0 The few authorities dealing explicitly with the problem have
45. However, the liability of the intermediate parties for conversion or for money
had and received is not doubtful. See Stern v. President and Directors of Manhattan
Co., 134 Misc. 351, 235 N. Y. Supp. 634 (Sup. Ct 1929); Crisp v. State Bank of
Rolla, 32 N. D. 263, 155 N. W. 78 (1915).
46. The first reported case allowing recovery for conversion is apparently Down
v. Hailing, 4 B. & C. 370, (K. B. 1825). See further, Talbot v. Bank of Rochester,
1 Hill 295 (N. Y. 1841). For a collection of cases, see Notes (1923) 31 A. L. R. 1068,
(1928) 67 A. L. R. 1531, 8 Am. JuRisPRuDENcE 318, n. 8, 319, n. 12.
47. Independent Oil Men's Ass'n v. Fort Dearborn Nat. Bank, 311 Ill. 278, 128
N. E. 458 (1924); Merchants & Manufacturers' Ass'n v. First Nat. Bank of Mich.,
40 Ariz. 531, 14 P. (2d) 717 (1932); Roracker v. Commercial State Bank, 191 Minn.
553, 254 N. W. 824 (1934); Nat. Union Bank of Md. v. Miller R. Co., 148 Md. 449,
129 Atl. 688 (1925). Contra: Tibby Bros. Glass Co. v. Farmers & Mechanics Bank of
Sharpsberg, 220 Pa. 1, 69 At. 280 (1908). The court based its denial of recovery
on the theory that there was no more privity between payee and recipient than between
payee and drawee bank. A further ground for the decision was that the recipient
did not receive money belonging to the plaintiff but money which belonged to the
drawee bank, since the drawee's payment did not affect the payee's claim against the
drawee on the latter's account with the drawee bank. The majority of cases, on the
other hand, have held that the rule denying recovery to the payee against the drawee
bank does not apply to a suit of the payee against the recipient. The Tibby case has
been overruled by Lindsley v. First Nat. Bank of Philadelphia, 190 At. 876 (Pa. 1937).
48. As to a possible difference in pleading, see Universal Car Loading and Dis-
tributing Co. v. South Side Bank, 224 Mo. App. 816, 27 S. W. (2d) 768 (1930).
49. Farmers v. Bank, 100 Tenn. 187, 47 S. W. 234 (1897); Buckly v. Second
Nat'l Bank, 35 N. J. L. 400, 10 Ad. 249 (1872); United States Portland Cement
Co. v. United States Nat'l Bank of Denver, 61 Colo. 334, 157 Pac. 202 (1916), It
apparently makes no difference whether the recipient is a purchaser or merely a
collecting agent under a restrictive indorsement; but an extension of the rule in Pratt
v. Higginson, 230 Mass. 256, 119 N. E. 661 (1918), to protect a collecting agent is not
impossible. As to the protection of the recipient agent when sued by the drawee, see
infra note 62.
50. For collection of cases, see Note (1923) 31 A. L. R. 1071.
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either held delivery to be immaterial"1 or have treated the suit by the
payee as sufficient a ratification of the drawer's mailing of the check
to constitute a constructive delivery to the payee '2
Should the true owner proceed against the recipient to recover the
proceeds of the instrument, the latter may, as we have seen, sue on the
implied warranty of genuineness against every indorser subsequent to
the forgery.5 3 A recovery from the recipient by the true owner transfers
"title" of the instrument to the former, so that the recipient, having paid
the rightful owner, is no longer liable to the drawee for the proceeds
received from him.54 Payment to the true owner has discharged the
instrument. The acceptor and the parties secondarily liable are, there-
fore, likewise no longer liable to the previous owner 5 The drawee who
has paid the subsequent purchaser can now, of course, debit the drawer's
account for the amount paid. The person who then has to bear the
ultimate loss is the indorsee who has bought the instrument from the
forger, for he has only an empty right against the forger.
Acceptor and Drawee. The acceptor is liable only to the true owner;
he is not to any holder taking subsequent to a forged indorsement." A
51. Allen v. Mendelsohn & Son, 207 Ala. 527, 93 So. 416 (1922), (1923) 21 Micr:
L REv. 819.
52. Crisp v. State Nat. Bank of Rolla, 32 N. D. 263, 155 N. V. 78 (1915);
Indiana Nat. Bank v. Holtschaw, 98 Ind. 85 (1884). As to the right of the remitter
to sue the recipient for conversion, see Talbot v. Rochester Bank, 1 Hill. 295 (N. Y.
1841). The right of the drawer as true owner to recover from the recipient if the
signature of the payee who never received the instrument vas forged by the drawer's
agent has been recognized on a conversion or money had and received rationale in
the following decisions: Life Insurance Co. v. Edisto National Bank, 166 S. C. 505,
165 S. E. 178 (1932); Gustin-Bacon Manufacturing Co. v. First National Bank,
306 Ill. 179, 137 N. E. 793 (1922); Labor Bank and Trust Co. v. Adams, 23 S. NV.
(2d) 814 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930). See Railroad Building Loan and Service Association
v. Bankers Mortgage Co., 142 Kan. 504, 51 P. (2d) 61 (1935).
The result seems to be different if the instrument was already received by the
payee through his dishonest agent. In this case only the payee can recover. The
drawer is precluded from recovery since he has neither title nor right of possession
to the instrument. United States v. Bank of Coney Island, 36 F. (2d) 829 (N. D.
Okla. 1929).
53. Note 41, supra.
54. Talbot v. Bank of Rochester, 1 Hill 245 (N. Y. 1841).
55. Haas v. Twenty-Third Ward Bank, N. Y. L J., Jan. 29, 1921, off'd, 200 App.
Div. 895 (1st Dep't 1922). In United States Portland Cement Co. v. United States
National Bank, 61 Colo. 334, 157 Pac. 202, (1916), the court assumed that the suit
of the true owner against the recipient released the drawer and drawee from the
duty of paying over again since such a suit amounted to a ratification of the assumed
payment. Accord: Independent Oil Men's Association v. The Fort Dearborn Nat.
Bank, 311 Ill. 278, 142 N. E. 458 (1924). In Moler v. State Bank of Bigelow., 176
Minn. 449, 233 N. W,. 780 (1929), the payee was given judgment against both the
collecting and the drawee bank for conversion.
56. BnrLs oF EXCHANGE Act, § 24; NEG TxALE INsm METrs LAW, § 23.
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payment to a purchaser holding under or through a forged indorsement
does not discharge the acceptor's obligation to the true owner. 7 The
acceptor (or drawee) who pays under a forged indorsement cannot
debit the drawer's account with such payment 8 unless the intended payee
has ultimately received the proceeds."9 The true owner may, instead of
suing the recipient, proceed against the acceptor, who in turn may re-
cover the money he has paid the recipient.60 The recipient can then sue
any of the indorsers subsequent to the forgery on their implied war-
ranty of the genuineness of the instrument."' If the recipient, however,
is a bank acting only as a collecting agent under a restrictive indorse-
ment, it can defeat the drawee's recovery by pleading that it turned over
the proceeds to its indorser, 62 unless it has given a guarantee of all
57. Smith v. Shepperd, note 22, supra; Cheape v. Harley, cited in Allen v. Handy,
3 T. R. 127 (1789).
58. The drawee-bank owes the drawer the absolute duty of paying only on his
authentic order and only to a holder under genuine indorsements. If the bank has
paid on a forged indorsement, it makes no difference how careful the bank was in
making payment or how impossible of detection the forgery was. The risk is assumed
by the bank and not the drawer-depositor, unless the bank can claim protection because
of negligence chargeable to the depositor. Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Home Savings
Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 182 Pac. 293 (1919); Shipman v. Bank of State, 126 N. Y. 318,
27 N. E. 371 (1891) ; Gutfreund v. East River Nat. Bank, 251 N. Y. 58, 167 N. E. 171
(1929); United States Cold Storage Co. v. Central Mfg. District Bank, 343 Ill. 503,
175 N. E. 825 (1931); American Sash and Door Co. v. Commercial Trust Co., 56
S. W. (2d) 1034 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1932); Detroit Piston Ring Co. v. Wayne County and
Home Savings Bank, 252 Mich. 163, 233 N. W. 185 (1930); Comment (1935) 33
MIcH. L. REV. 759. There is a split of authority on the question of whether the
drawer's right to demand recrediting of his account is conditioned upon his surrendering
the forged instrument to the drawee (in return for security or a receipt) to enable
the drawee-bank to proceed further against prior indorsers. Redington v. Woods,
45 Cal. 406 (1873); Van Wert National Bank v. First National Bank, 6 Ohio C. C.
130 (1891); Showers v. Merchants National Bank, 293 Pa. 241, 142 Ath. 275 (1928),
(1928) 42 HARv. L. REV. 125. Contra: United States v. National Bank of Commerce,
205 Fed. 433 (C.C.A. 9th, 1913).
59. Beeson More Shoe Co. v. Clark County Bank, 160 Ark. 385, 254 S. IV. 667
(1923); Yanowe Co. v. American Exchange Irving Tr. Co., 226 App. Div. 530, 234
N. Y. Supp. 603 (1st Dep't 1929). But cf. Shipman v. The Bank of the State of
New York, 126 N. Y. 318, 27 N. E. 371 (1891).
60. Note 69, infra.
61. Note 41, suipra.
62. See Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany, 1 Hill 287 (N. Y. 1841); Holt v. Ross,
54 N. Y. 472 (1873); cf. National Park Bank v. Seaboard Bank, 114 N. Y. 28,
20 N. E. 632 (1890) (checks raised and name of payee altered); National City Bank
v. Westcott, 118 N. Y. 468, 23 N. E. 100 (1890) (raised check); Crocker-Woolworth
Nat. Bank v. Nevada Bank, 139 Cal. 564, 73 Pac. 456 (1903); WooDAwRD, QuAsr
CONTRACTS (1913) §27; (1929) 42 HARv. L. Ray. In such a case the payor may
recover from the principal. Star Fire Ins. Co. v. New -Hampshire Nat. Bank, 60
N. H. 442 (1881). A restrictive indorsement by the recipient, however, has no such
effect. Citizens Nat. Bank v. City Nat. Bank, 111 Iowa 211, 82 N. W. 464 (1900).
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prior indorsements.s Upon receiving notice from the drawee bank that
it has collected a check on a forged indorsement, the collecting bank
need not wait until sued by the drawee before taking the next step. It
may refund the proceeds to the drawee and, where the check was received
from a depositor, charge it back against the latter's account."
Many courts have even allowed the true owner of a check to recover
the face amount of the instrument from the drawee bank which has
paid to the wrong person by holding that such a payment constituted a
conversion;' other courts have allowed an action for money had and
received. 66  This rule has not changed in most jurisdictions despite the
introduction of Section 189 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, which
declares that the drawing of a check by itself does not constitute an
assignment of the underlying funds and further states that the drawee-
bank is not liable to the holder unless and until it has accepted or certi-
fied the check.67  A few courts prior to, and even after the Negotiable
Instruments Law, have held the drawee-bank which had paid the forged
check and charged the drawer's account as an acceptor. 3
63. W H.LsToN, NEG OT BLE INsTRumENTs (1931); 2 PAT'ozs Dxcr.s? (1926)
n. 2185a.
64. BBADY, ON BANK CECs (2d ed. 1926) § 167; Oriental Bank v. Gallo, 112
App. Div. 360, 98 N. Y. Supp. 461 (1906), off'd, 18S N. Y. 610, 81 N. E. 1170 (1907) ;
Geering v. Metropolitan Bank, 170 App. Div. 751, 156 N. Y. Supp. 582 (1915).
65. Schmidt v. Garfield Nat. Bank, 19 N. Y. Supp. 252, 64 Hun. 293 (1893);
aff'd, 138 N. Y. 631, 33 N. E. 1084 (1894); Graves v. The American Exchange Bank,
17 N. Y. 205 (1858). Aigler, Rights of Holder of Bill of Exchange Against the
Drawer (1925) 38 HAv. L. REv. 857, 878 et seq.
66. See National Bank of the Republic v. Millard, 10 Wall. 152 (1896); Noron,
BLLs AND Norm, (4th ed. 1914) 586. Contra: First Nat. Bank v. Whitman, 94 U. S.
343 (1876).
67. Recovery on theory of conversion: Ellery v. Peoples National Bank, 114
N. Y. Supp. 108 (Sup. Ct. 1909); Burstein v. Peoples Trust Co., 143 App. Div. 165,
127 N. Y. Supp. 1092 (2d Dep't 1911); Siegel v. Kovinsky, 93 Misc. Rep. 541, 157
N. Y. Supp. 340 (Sup. Ct. 1916); Kansas City Co. v. Westport Ave. Ban:, 191 Mo.
App. 287, 177 S. NV. 1092 (1915); Louisville and Nashville R.R. v. Citizens and
Peoples National Bank v. Pensacola, 74 Fla. 385, 77 So. 104 (1917) ; Tanner v. Union
National Bank, 283 Ill. App. 159 (1925); Kentucky Title Savings Bank v. Dunavan,
205 Ky. 801, 266 S. V. 667 (1924). Assumpsit: James v. Union National Bank, 238
Ill. App. 159 (1925), (1926) 26 CoL. L. REv. 113; Independent Oil Men's Association
v. Dearborn National Bank, 311 II. 278, 124 N. E. 453 (1924). Contra: Gordon Fire-
works Co. v. Capital National Bank, 236 Milch. 271, 210 N. W. 263 (1926), (1926)
25 Aica. L. REv. 454; Lonier v. State Savings Bank, 149 1fich. 483, 112 N. NV. 1119
(1907) ; Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. First National Bank, 102 Va. 753 (1904). See
further, Chafee, Progress of the Law-Bills and Notes (1919) 33 HAnv. L. Rn,. 255,
270.
68. Cf. Pickle v. Muse, 88 Tenn. 380, 13 S. NV. 919 (1890) ; Seventh National Bank
v. Cook, 73 Pa. 483 (1873); Chamberlain Metal Co. v. Bank of Pleasanton, 93 Kan.
611, 160 Pac. 1138 (1916); cf. Dawson v. National Bank of Greenfield, 196 N. C. 134,
144 S. E. 833 (1928); (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 1143, (1931) 25 Iu. L. Rnv. 343; cf.
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The acceptor or drawee who has to pay again to the real owner be-
cause the debt has not been discharged by the payment to the apparent
owner is, of course, entitled to recover from the recipient the amount
paid him, 9 the recipient in turn from his transferor, etc., until the forger
is reached."'
In this respect the English law differs from the American where the
instrument bearing the forged indorsement is a demand bill drawn on
a banker. According to Section 60 of the Bills of Exchange Act
"it is not incumbent on the banker who has paid such an instru-
ment in good faith and in the ordinary course of business to show
that the indorsement of the payee of any subsequent indorsement
was made by or under the authority of the person whose indorse-
ment it purports to be and the banker is deemed to have paid the
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Jacobs, 287 S. W. 1000 (Tex. Civ. App.
1922). Contra: Lone Star Trucking Co. v. City Nat. Bank of Commerce, 240 S. W.
1000 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); Elyria Savings and Banking Co. v. Walker Bin Co.,
92 Ohio St. 406, 111 N. E. 147 (1915); First National Bank v. Whitman, 98 U. S.
343 (1876).
69. For a collection of cases see L.R.A. 1916E 539; BAvY oN BANx CHECxS (2d
ed. 1926) § 165, Supp. (1929) § 165. The same rules apply to the maker of a note. Car-
penter v. Northborough National Bank, 123 Mass. 766 (1877); Oil Refining Co. v.
Bryant, 110 Okla. 83, 236 Pac. 431 (1925). The drawee or acceptor is under no duty to the
recipient to ascertain the genuineness of the chain of indorsements. Corn Exchange Bank
v. Nassau Bank, 91 N. Y. 74 (1883). The fact that the payee whose endorsement had
been forged is also a customer of a drawee bank does not affect recovery. Missouri
Lincoln Trust Co. v. Third Nat. Bank, 154 Mo. App. 89, 133 S. W. 357 (1910).
The courts have rested recovery on different rationales. In many cases it has been
based on the quasi contract ground of money paid under mutual mistake. Canal Bank
v. Bank of Albany, 1 Hill 287 (N. Y. 1841) ; First National Bank of Minnesota v. City
National Bank of Holyoke, 182 Mass. 130, 65 N. E. 24 (1902). In some cases, the basis
has been a warranty of the genuineness of indorsements implied by the presentation and
collection of the instrument. United States v. National Exchange Bank of Providence,
214 U. S. 302 (1909). Other cases have used both grounds. Yatesville Banking Co. v.
First National Bank, 10 Ga. App. 1 (1911). Still other courts have held the recipient
liable as indorser on the basis of the Negotiable Instruments Law §§ 65, 66. American
Exchange National Bank v. Yorkville Bank of N. Y., 122 Misc. Rep. 606, 204 N. Y.
Supp. 621 (Sup. Ct. 1924); Kleinman v. Chase National Bank of the City of New
York, 124 Misc. Rep. 173, 207 N. Y. Supp. 191 (Sup. Ct. 1924). For a criticism of this
rationalization, see South Boston Trust Co. v. Levin, 249 Mass. 245, 143 N. E. 816
(1924) ; First Nat. Bank v. United States Nat. Bank, 100 Ore. 264, 288, 197 Pac. 547,
555 (1921). See in general, Woodward, Risk of Forgery or Alteration of Negotiable
Instruments (1924) 24 CoL. L. REV. 469. Dean Ames preferred to base the recovery of
the drawee on a theory of subrogation, but he conceded that as a matter of positive law
the acceptor or maker is allowed to proceed directly without first paying the true owner.
Ames, supra note 1, at 307.
The right of action accrues at the date of payment and the Statute of Limitation begins
to run from this date and not only after a demand for repayment has been made. Leather
Manufacturers Bank v. Merchants Bank, 128 U. S. 26 (1888); (1938) 47 Y=im L. J. 827.
70. Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany, 1 Hill 287 (N. Y. 1841); cf. Closter Nat. Bank
v. Federal Reserve Bank, 285 Fed. 138 (C. C. A. 2d, 1922), (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 615.
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bill in due course, although such an indorsement has been forged
or made without authority."
Under this priovision the true owner has no cause of action against
the banker for conversion nor has he any cause of action against a prior
secondary party, since the instrument is discharged."' The drawee, more-
over, can debit the drawer's account. But the true owner continues to
have a cause of action against the recipient,72 who in turn may recover
from his predecessor, and so on until the forger is reached. In theory
the solution of the American law leads to the same result.
Prior Secondary Parties. A payment by the acceptor or dravee to
the wrong holder does not discharge prior secondary parties with respect
to the true owner.73 Instead of suing the recipient or the acceptor, the
latter may therefore proceed against these prior secondary parties. Since
the liability of secondary parties on the instrument is predicated upon
due presentment and due notice of dishonor, it would seem that only
after he has performed these conditions does the true owner of the
instrument have a claim on the instrument against those parties, even
in a case where the instrument has been paid by the acceptor or drawee
to the wrong party. 4 This rule is not prejudicial to the true owner since
the Negotiable Instruments Law by implication permits him to present
a copy of the instrument to the drawee.75 Against his immediate prede-
cessor, the owner may, of course, also proceed on the underlying claim.70
Should the true owner, for example, the payee, fall back on the prior
party, in our case, the drawer, the latter could demand from the drawee-
bank that his account be recredited; the drawee bank could then in turn
recover from the recipient, etc., until the forger is reached. In theory
this choice of the true owner may mean a considerable amount of un-
necessary litigation which would be largely avoided if the true owner
proceeds directly against the recipient.
71. Charles v. Blackwell, 2 C. P. D. 151 (1877).
72. Ogden v. Benas, L. R. 9 C. P. 513 (1874); Arnold v. Cheque Bank, 1 C. P. D.
578 (1876) ; but see BiLLs oF EXCHANGE AcT § 82.
73. (1926) 26 COL. L. REv. 113; but see James v. Union Nat. Bank, 238 Ill. App. 159
(1925).
74. The writer of the note in (1926) 26 CoL L. REv. 113 takes the position that in
such a situation presentment and notice are dispensed with under the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law, §§ 82, 159, or that at least delay in making presentment or giving notice is
excused under §§ 81, 159, 113. See further, First Nat. Bank of Belle Plaine v. McCon-
nell, 103 Minn. 340, 114 N. IV. 1129 (1903).
75. § 160; Hinsdale v. Miles, 5 Conn. 331 (1824) ; Kavanaugh v. The Farmers Bank
of Maitland, 59 Mo. App. 540 (1894).
76. Falconi v. Magee, 47 Pa. Sup. Ct. 560 (1911); Siegel v. Kovinsky, 93 Misc. Rep.
541, 157 N. Y. Supp. 340 (Sup. Ct. 1916); Thomson v. Bank of British North America,
82 N. Y. (1880); Shephard v. Eldridge, 171 Mass. 516, 51 N. E. 9 (1893). But see
infra note 97.
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Thus the protection given to the true owner of an order instrument
against the loss of the instrument by reason of a forgery of his signa-
ture is complete. He may proceed either against the subsequent pur-
chaser who has collected the proceeds, or against the acceptor and, pos-
sibly, even against the drawee who has paid the instrument to the wrong
party, or finally, in case of dishonor, against prior secondary parties.
It is obvious that the American rule is designed to place the ultimate
liability upon the purchaser from the forger.
III.
But while the Anglo-American rule appears to give a broad protection
to the true owner against liability, i.e., suit by other parties, as well as
against loss of title, i.e., the right to sue on the instrument, it has been
limited in situations where the other parties, in some cases even the
purchaser from the forger, are considered to be more deserving of
protection than the true owner. The true owner's unworthiness of pro-
tection appears in different shades, and may be distinguished by the
following behavior types: (1) He may affirmatively adopt the forged
signature as his own, or, upon being asked about the genuineness of his
signature, may fail to repudiate the signature. (2) He may not be
questioned about the genuineness and may simply refrain, without being
asked, from informing one of the other parties, for example, a prospec-
tive purchaser known to him or the drawee, of a discovered forged
indorsement. (3) Finally, he may fail to discover the forgery, or may
enable the committing of an act of forgery, by not using reasonable care.
In all these instances, the true owner's behavior may or may not cause
injury to one of the other parties. Likewise, lack of reasonable care
in discovering a forgery or in giving notice of a discovered forgery
may be attributable to one of the other parties in the circle.
Ratification. This appears to be a clear case against the true owner,
and subsequent purchasers have frequently tried to recover on the instru-
ment from a purported indorser whose signature has been forged where
they have been prejudiced by acting in reliance on the ostensible indorser's
express adoption of, or silent acquiescence, in the forgery; and suit
has sometimes been brought even where there was no prejudice. The
Anglo-American, like the German,7 courts have not hesitated to allow
recovery where the plaintiff indorsee had purchased an instrument in
reliance on the affirmative answer of the ostensible indorser that the
signature was genuine"' or where such an answer had prevented the
77. Reichsgericht, June 3, 1913, 82 R. G. 337; Reichsgericht, July 6, 1934, 63 Juzus-
TXSCHE WOCHENSCERIFT (1934) 2550.
78. Gluckman v. Darling, 85 N. J. L. 457, 89 Atl. 1016 (1914) (prior indorser's
conduct held wilfully misleading); see Woodruff v. Robinson, 33 Md. 146 (1870) ; cf.
Pearson v. Hardin, 95 Mich. 360, 54 N. W. 904 (1893) ; Leach v. Buchanan, 4 Esp. 226
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indorsee who had bought the instrument, from recovering from a solvent
forger."9 In situations of this kind the courts have allowed the purchaser
to recover the face value of the instrument, irrespective of the amount
of the actual damage suffered, by applying an estoppel or sometimes a
ratification rationale."0 If the purchaser had already collected the pro-
ceeds, they have allowed him to keep them under like circumstances.
The same kind of protection has been given to a drawee who had paid
in good faith and in reliance on such an assertion."' If, on the other
hand, the purchaser or drawee has been unable to prove that he has
suffered actual, and not only conjectural, reliance damages, the majority
of the Anglo-American courts, unlike the German courts, 2 have denied
recovery. 3 This attitude has frequently found its expression in the
formula that "without some element of estoppel or new consideration,
a forgery cannot be ratified." '
Failure to give zotice of a discovered forgery. If the purported in-
dorser, instead of adopting affirmatively the forged signature, failed only
to notify the purchaser of a discovered forgery, his liability to the
purchaser seems to be predicated upon the court's finding that "he was
under-a duty and opportunity to speak and he knew or had reason to
(N. D. 1803) ; 2 P.sows oN Norms AND Bi.ms (1873) 593; Forsyth v. Day, 46 Me. 176
(1858); Lancaster v. Baltzell, 7 Gill & Johns. 468 (Md. 1836).
79. Fall River National Bank v. Buffinton, 97 Mass. 498 (1867); Casco Bank v.
Keene 53 Me. 103 (1865).
80. For collection of cases, see note (1912) 36 L. R. A. (n.s.) 1007. "An estoppel
may be limited to the person acting upon it and to the subject matter to which it relates;
but it cannot be apportioned." Casco Bank v. Bank of Keene 53 Me. 103 (1865). With
regard to estoppel by failure to repudiate, see Traders' Nat. Bank v. Rogers, 167 Mass.
315, 45 N. E. 923 (1897).
81. The drawee is no less worthy of protection than a bona fide purchaser.
82. At least if there was an express adoption. Reichsgericht, June 3, 1913, 82 R.G.
337. This attitude is not surprising since the German law has no consideration dogma. If
the purported indorser merely failed to repudiate his signature, he is only liable for
reliance damages. Reichsgericht, November 25, 1927, 57 JurasTscmr Wocn mscun r
(1928) 396.
83. (1912) 36 L. R. A. (N.s.) 1007.
84. Id., at 1006, 1112. The arguments which are usually advanced individually or in
combination against the recognition of such a pure ratification are: (1) To admit the
binding effect of an act constituting the crime of forgery would be against public policy.
(2) Since a forger, unlike an unauthorized agent, did not purport to act on behalf of
the person whose signature has been forged, there was no basis for a ratification. (3)
The contract of the forger being void, ratification amounted to a new contract which was
unenforceable without a new consideration. Shisler v. Vandike, 92 Pa. 447 (1880) ; c.
Workmen v. Wright, 33 Ohio St. 405 (1878); Catskill National Bank v. Lasker, 161
App. Div. 548, 151 N. Y. Supp. 191 (1915); Brook v. Brook (1871) L. R. 6 Ex 89.
Contra: Greenfield Bank v. Crafts, 4 Allen 447 (Mass. 1862). As to the requisites of
ratification, see Traders National Bank v. Rogers, 167 Mass. 315, 45 N. E. 923 (1897).
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know that the holder would rely on his silence and would be injured
thereby." 5
Where the issue is that of the title of the ostensible indorser rather
than of his liability, some of the cases on the point have denied the true
owner recovery from an innocent purchaser who collected the proceeds,"'
or from the drawee bank which paid the check,"' if the owner's silence
or failure to give timely notice has prevented those parties from getting
compensation from a forger who was still solvent at the time notice
should have been given.88
The foregoing "ratification" cases present additional problems. Let
us suppose that a subsequent purchaser, instead of suing the impecunious
payee on his ratified indorsement, sues the acceptor or, in case of dis-
honor, the drawer. Can the purchaser meet the forgery defense by plead-
ing that the payee is precluded from setting it up and that the acceptor
or payee are therefore similarly precluded? This question is of vital
concern to all the parties. An answer in the affirmative enables the
purchaser to collect an otherwise uncollectible debt. Acceptor and drawer,
on the other hand, have to be protected against the danger of double
liability, for a judgment against them in favor of the innocent purchaser
based on the payee's assumed ratification is not res judicata in a subse-
quent suit by the true owner against them. Since the forgery defense
is given to parties prior to the forgery as an absolute defense to protect
them against the danger of double payment, it can be taken away only
85. Cf. Shinew v. First Nat. Bank of Bowling Green, 84 Ohio St. 297, 97 N. E. 881
(1911) ; First Nat. Bank of Union Bridge v. Wolfe, 140 Md. 479, 117 Atl. 898 (1922);
Boone v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 290 S. W. 39 (Tenn. 1927); Corser v. Parsh,
41 N. H. 24 (1860); McKenzie v. British Linen Co., 6 A. C. 82 (Ex. 1881). For col-
lection of cases, see note (1923) 25 A. L. R. 177.
86. Brown v. Peoples National Bank, 170 Mich. 417, 136 N. W. 506 (1912) ; EWART
ON ESTOPPEL (1900) 135, 136. Contra: Independent Oil Men's Association v. Fort Dear-
born Nat. Bank, 311 Ill. 278, 142 N. E. 458 (1924) ; see Stern v. President and Directors
of Manhattan Co., 134 Misc. Rep. 351, 235 N. Y. Supp. 634 (1929); cf. Hamlin v. Sears,
82 N. Y. 327 (1881).
87. State v. First National Bank of Montrose, 203 Pa. 69, 52 AtI. 13 (1902);
Marks v. Anchor Savings Bank, 252 Pa. 304, 97 Atl. 392 (1910) (certified check
and therefore no problem of lack of privity); Annett v. Chase Nat. Bank, 196 App.
Div. 632, 188 N. Y. Supp. 7 (1921); (1921) 21 COL. L. REV. 703. Contra: Stern v.
President and Directors of Manhattan Co., 134 Misc. 551, 235 N. Y. Supp. 634 (1929).
It is interesting that CrITry ON BmLs (1799), citing Mains and Pothier, advises the
holder to notify the acceptor immediately of a loss of the instrument without elaborating
the consequences of the holder's failure to do so. In later editions this passage has
been omitted.
88. If, however, the true owner's laches have caused no prejudice to the subsequent
purchaser or to the drawee, courts have usually allowed the true owner to recover.
Blum v. Whipple, 194 Mass. 253, 80 N. E. 501 (1907) (subsequent purchaser, more
than two years delay between discovery of the forgery and notification); Lindenthal
v. Northwest State Bank, 221 I1. App. 145 (1921) (drawee). Contra: Annett v.
Chase Nat Bank, 196 App. Div. 632, 188 N. Y. Supp. 7 (1921).
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if they are safeguarded against this danger. The problem is, however,
largely solved by the modem statutory interpleader provisions, both state
and federal, under which the acceptor or drawer may be able to inter-
plead the "true owner" in the state court where the suit is pending, if
the latter is subject to the jurisdiction of that court,80 or in the com-
petent federal court."' In so far as those parties are protected by such
statutory provisions, there seems to be no reason for denying an abso-
lute effect to a ratification. The right of interpleader is of equal im-
portance t6 the acceptor or drawee who has not yet paid the subsequent
purchaser and is sued by the true owner, in our case, the payee, rather
than by the subsequent purchaser.
Another problem in these cases arises where the indorsee in our il-
lustration, with respect to whom the purported indorser would be estopped
to deny the genuineness of his signature, forces a party subsequent to the
forgery to take up the instrument. Can the latter sue either the purported
indorser or a prior party and plead ratification? Doctrinal difficulties to
this possibility are presented by the theory that a party secondarily liable
who pays an instrument does not enjoy the rights of the last holder but
is merely remitted to his former rights as regards all prior parties."'
Until now we have investigated only the results of the true owner's
ratification or failure to give notice of a discovered forgery to all parties
concerned. This problem, however, does not only concern the true owner.
A subsequent purchaser may fail to notify prior secondary parties, the
drawer may fail to notify the drawee, or the drawee may fail to notify
the recipient. There are not many cases discussing the "duty" of a sub-
sequent purchaser to notify prior parties of a discovered forgery. Still,
we have the interesting case of Rick v. Kelley " in which the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court required the purchaser of a note to give notice of the
forgery within reasonable time after its discovery "unless the note be
shown to possess no value." In contrast to this scarcity of decisions dis-
cussing the purchaser's duty of notification there are quite a few cases
involving the duty of the drawer of a check to notify the drawee bank
of a discovered forgery of the payee's signature. Has the drawer for-
feited by his laches his right against the drawee bank which paid his
check to demand that his account be recredited? The courts have answered
in the affirmative, relying upon the duty imposed by the customer-bank
relationship, the majority of them, however, only where the delay has
89. See, e.g., N. Y. C. P. A., §§285-287.
90. An Act to Amend Section 24 of the Judicial Code by Conferring on district
courts additional jurisdiction of Bills of Interpleader and of Bills in the nature of
Interpleader. 28 U. S. C.A., § 41 (24).
91. N EOrIABLE IiNsTRurrs LAw, § 121.
92. 30 Pa. 527 (1858).
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been prejudicial to the bank."3 Likewise, the drawee has been denied
recovery from the recipient where his laches have been prejudicial to
the latter.9 '
Failure to discover a forgery by lack of supervision of agents hand-
ling negotiable instruments. We now come to the third behavior type
mentioned. This appears to present the weakest case against the true
owner. It is tied up with the question of the liability of the principal
for the acts of his agent, and since it is of practical importance to all
business concerns, considerations of business practice become of vital
significance in these cases. Frequently the drawer or the true owner,
for instance, the payee, of a negotiable instrument enables the forgery
of an indorsement by lack of due care, particularly by lack of efficient
supervising of his employees. Very often the fabrication of a whole
series of forgeries by an employee over a period of years 5 was possible
only because either the drawer or the true owner, as the case may have
been, did not use an efficient system of control over what happened to
negotiable instruments either drawn or received. In situations of this
kind, the courts have gone to extremes in adhering to the old rule pro-
tecting the true owner or the drawer, with the result that employers
have had no incentive to build up an effective system of control over
their employees.
In Shephard and Morse Lumber Co. v. Eldridge0  a creditor who had
received from his debtor two checks in payment of a debt sued the
93. See, e.g., Houseman-Spitzley Corp. v. American State Bank, et al,, 205
Mich. 268, 171 N. W. 543 (1919); National Surety Co. v. President and Directora
of Manhattan Co., 252 N. Y. 247, 169 N. E. 372 (1929). The Pennsylvania rule is
contra. McNeely v. Bank of North America, 221 Pa. 588, 70 AtI. 891 (delay of
three months); Connors v. Old Forge Discount & Deposit Bank, 245 Pa. 97, 91 At.
210 (1914) (notice given 43 days after discovery, damage not in issue). If the forgery
has been committed by the servant of the drawer, the servant's knowledge is not im-
putable to the drawer-principal, since the agent is acting in his own interest. United
Security Life Ins. & Trust Co. of Pennsylvania v. Central Nat. Bank of Philadelphia,
185 Pa. 586, 40 Atl. 97 (1898).
94. Merchants National Bank v. Federal State Bank, 206 M1ich. 8, 117 N. W.
390 (1919); see Yatesville Banking Co. v. Fourth National Bank, 10 Ga. App. 1,
72 S. E. 528 (1911). The drawee is required to give notice with reasonable prompt-
ness. National Exchange Bank of Providence v. United States, 151 Fed. 402 (C. C. A.
1st, 1907). The diligence required in giving such a notice is not the same as that
called for in the giving of a notice of dishonor. Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany, 1 Hill
287 (N. Y. 1841); Schroeder v. Harvey, 75 111. 638 (1874). The English law is
apparently stricter. London & River Plate Bank v. Bank of Liverpool, 1 Q. B. 7
(1896); cf. Cocks v. Masterman, 9 B. & C. 902 (K. B. 1829). Section 50(3) of the
Canadian Bills of Exchange Act expressly permits the drawee and all parties subse-
quent to the forgery to recover if notice of the forgery be given within a reasonable
time after knowledge of the forgery has been acquired.
95. See infra, page 889.
96. 171 Mass. 516 (1898).
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latter for the amount of the original indebtedness, the checks having
been embezzled by a dishonest employee who had converted the proceeds
to his own use. The drawer's defense was that the plaintiff had intrusted
the checks to a clerk who, a proper examination of the books would
have revealed, was dishonest, and had thus given the clerk an opportunity
to forge the payee's signature. This defense was unsuccessful," the court
saying:
"We are of opinion that the holder of an unindorsed check, pay-
able to his own order, is under no legal obligation to the drawer to
exercise care as to how the check shall be kept, or to whom he shall
commit its custody, or to see to it that the check shall not be put
in circulation by the forgery of his indorsement, so long as he acts
honestly without collusion. Such a holder is not deprived of his
remedy against the drawer by merely negligently intrusting such a
check to a clerk who, due care would have told him, was dishonest,
and thus giving the clerk an opportunity to commit crime. He has
the right to assume that his clerk will not commit a crime, and to
rest upon the presumption that he has not stolen or forged, and will
not do so, and he is under no legal obligation, either to the drawer
of the check or to the public, to see to it that the check is not put
in circulation with a forged indorsement." 08
The court apparently felt that this result was not too harsh on the de-
fendant because the latter could demand from the solvent drawee-bank
that his account be recredited.99 When the issue has been one of the true
owner's title rather than his liability, bona fide purchasers have been
equally unsuccessful with such a defense when sued by the true owner
in conversion. 00
More frequently presented to the courts in recent years has been the
problem of whether the drawer of a check is under obligation to the
drawee-bank or to the public to prevent his checks from being put in
circulation with forged indorsements. Do we find the attitudes of the
courts here the same as in the cases involving the payee? These are
the typical circumstances in which the problem most often arises. In
97. The drawer, however, is discharged if the check was received by an agent of
the payee who had authority to receive though not to cash checks. Mfills v. Hurley
Hardware & Furniture Co., 129 Ark. 350, 196 S. NV. 121 (1917); Burstein v. Sullivan,
134 App. Div. 623, 119 N. Y. Supp. 317 (2d Dep't 1909); MacFadden v. Folirath,
114 Minn. 85 N. E. (1911); Louisville & Nashville Ry. v. Citizens & People's Nat.
Bank of Pensacola, 74 Fla. 385, 77 So. 164 (1917).
98. Shephard and Morse Lumber Co. v. Eldridge, 171 Mass. 516, at 528 (1893).
99. Id., at 519.
100. Patent Safety Gun Cotton Co. v. Wilson, 49 L. J. Q. B. (z.S.) 713 (1880);
First Nat. Bank of Montgomery v. Montgomery Mfg. Co., 211 Ala. 551, 101 So. 186
(1924). But see General Cigar Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Portland, 290 Fed. 143 (C. C. A.
9th, 1923). As to the defense of contributory negligence, see Shephard and Morse Lum-
ber Co. v. Eldridge, 171 Mass. 516, 527 (1893).
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pursuance of a scheme to defraud his employer a dishonest employee,
who was in charge of preparing checks for payments, made out checks
to fictitious creditors, presented them to an officer of the employer who
signed them without checking their correctness, and, after having forged
the signature of the purported payees, cashed them with his bank. The
drawee-bank charged the drawer's account with the amounts paid to
the collecting bank, and the drawer received with the monthly statement
the checks bearing the forged indorsements. Very often such a scheme
would be continued for years and would involve large amounts, because
a comparison of the vouchers with the check register showed no irregu-
larities, and no additional check up was made on the seemingly trust-
worthy employee. When finally the scheme broke down and the forgeries
were discovered, the drawer demanded from the drawee-bank that his
account be recredited with the amounts paid on the forged checks, a
demand which was regularly refused. These were the regular lines of
defense taken by the drawee-bank: That an account stated between the
bank and its depositor barred a recovery; that the drawee-bank was
protected, because the checks, having been made payable to fictitious
payees, were payable to bearer; that the depositor's negligence estopped
him from making the claim, since that negligence had caused damage to
the drawee-bank which acted in reliance. 110
It is impossible to give an exhaustive history of the struggle between
drawee-bank and drawer-depositor. Only its more important phases can
be reported."0 2 The first line of defense has broken down completely.
Courts have generally taken the view that since a depositor accepted
the accounts in ignorance of the frauds perpetrated upon him, he ac-
cepted them as correct under the mistake of fact and was therefore not
bound by the account stated.0 3 The customer has also been successful
on two other strategic points. He has been able to convince a considerable
body of authorities that the checks made payable to fictitious creditors
were not payable to fictitious payees and could, therefore, not be paid
by the drawee-bank with impunity as bearer checks. These courts have
argued that the drawer did not know the payees to be fictitious and did
not intend to make the checks payable to fictitious persons, that, on the
contrary, he believed in good faith that the names of the payees repre-
sented real persons entitled to receive from him the amounts designated
101. Welsh v. German-American Bank, 73 N. Y. 424 (1878); National Surety Co.
v. President and Directors of Manhattan Co., 252 N. Y. 247, 169 N. E. 372 (1929);
Detroit Piston Ring Co. v. Wayne County and Home Savings Bank, 252 Mich. 163, 233
N. W. 185 (1930); Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Home Savings Bank, 180 Cal. 601,
182 Pac. 293 (1919).
102. For collection of cases, see (1935) 99 A. L. R. 426, at 439.
103. Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Home Savings Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 182 Pac. 293
(1919); National Surety Co. v. President and Directors of Manhattan Co,, and Detroit
Piston Ring Co. v. Wayne County and Home Savings Bank, both cited supra, note 101.
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by the checks. The knowledge of the dishonest agent has generally
been regarded as irrelevant, since he was not acting within the scope of
his employment in carrying out a scheme of fraud upon the drawer . "
But in a few jurisdictions, the knowledge of the servant or agent of
the fictitious character of the payee has been, by statutory provision,
imputed to the drawer principal.1"' Furthermore, the preponderant ma-
jority of courts have held that the customer is under no duty to his bank
upon the return of the vouchers to ascertain the genuineness of indorse-
ments on checks drawn by him. He cannot be expected to know even
the signature of the payee. His duty to examine his pass book and
the returned vouchers and to compare them vith the check register is
limited to ascertaining the genuineness of his own signature and the
amount paid.1" 6 The customer has a right "to assume that the bank before
paying his check will ascertain the genuineness of the indorsements."'0 7
104. Welsh v. German- American Bank, 73 N. Y. 424 (1878); Shipman v. Bank of
State of New York, 126 N. Y. 318 (1891) ; Jordan Marsh Co. v. National Shav%,mut Bank,
201 Mass. 397, 87 N.E. 740 (1909); American Sash and Door Co. v. Commercial Trust
Co., 56 S. W. (2d) 1034, (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1932); United States Cold Storage Co. v. Cen-
tral Manufacturing District Co., 343 Il. 503, 175 N. E. 825 (1931), (1936) 9 So. CAT. L.
REv. 397, (1927) 27 Iu.. L Rnv. 65; Los Angeles Investment Co. v. House Savings
Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 182 Pac. 293 (1919). Nc, oTmt= INsTanu, rs LAw §9(3).
A different result has, however, been reached if the dishonest emp!oyee drew the check
himself and had authority to do so. Phillips v. Mercantile Nat. Bank, 140 N. Y. 556,
35 N. E. 982 (1894) ; Snyder v. Corn Exchange Bank, 221 Pa. 599, 70 At. 876 (1903).
As to the interpretation of Bus OF EXCHANGE Acr § 7, see BYx.us On BMLs (19th ed.
1931) 84. See in general, Kulp, The Fictitious Payee (1920) 18 Mien. L REv. 296;
Thayer, Fictitious Payees in Bills of Exchange: A Comparative Study (1937) 25 KY.
L. J. 203.
105. l.t.. REv. STAT. (SmrTH-HuRD, 1935) c. 98, § 29 (3), which was passed at the
instance of the American Banking Association; IDmHO CODE ANN. (1932) § 26-109 (3);
Mo-r. REv. CODES ANN. (ANDERSON & MCFARLAND, 1935) § 8416 (3).
106. Concerning the depositor's duties in this respect, see the cases collected in (1921)
15 A. L. . 159, (1930) 67 A. L. 1. 1121; Arant, Forged Cliec.s-The Duty of the
Depositor to His Bank (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 593.
107. Welsh v. German-American Bank, 73 N. Y. 424 (1878); National Surety Co.
v. President and Directors of Manhattan Co., 252 N. Y. 247, 169 N. E. 372 (1929);
American Exchange Nat. Bank v. Yorkville Bank of New York, 122 Misc. 616, 204
N. Y. Supp. 621 (Sup. Ct. 1924), aff'd, 210 App. Div. 883, 206 N. Y. Supp. 879 (1925) ;
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Chase Nat. Bank, 153 Misc. 538, 275 N. Y. Supp. 311 (Sup.
Ct. 1934); DeWolf v. Foreman National Bank, 264 IlL App. 23 (1931); Guardian
Savings and Loan Association v. Liberty State Bank, 60 S. V. 823 (Tex. Civ. App.
1933). But see Union Tool Co. v. Farmers and Merchants National Bank of Los
Angeles, 192 Cal. 40, 218 Pac. 424 (1923) where the court said by way of dictum
that the depositor is under a duty to ascertain the genuineness of indorsements. But
in this case there was "an agreement with depositor" in the bank's passbook which
required him to examine both the face and the indorsements of returned checks. The
dishonest employee had presented forged freight bills to the employer and prepared
checks payable to "Mueller, Agent, Pacific Railroad," erased the name of the railroad
from the check, forged the indorsement of Mueller, and cashed the check.. The court
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For the same reason courts have generally declined to apply to cases of
forged indorsements statutory provisions providing a time limit for a
customer's recovery against his bank on forged or raised checks and
have limited the application of such a provision to a forgery of the
drawer-customer's signature."'0
Although it is a pure fiction to assume that the drawee-bank has better
means of ascertaining the genuineness of indorsements than the drawer,
there is no reason to quarrel with the application of the rule in cases
where the comparison of the pass- or check-book, or the check stubs, with
the vouchers did not disclose forged indorsements because there was no
discrepancy between them; in situations of this kind the rule is good
policy because it forces banks not to cash, and the drawee-bank in par-
ticular not to pay, checks to strangers but only to reliable customers or
another bank and only after having secured a guarantee of the genuine-
ness of prior indorsements.' 0 9 But should this rule also be applied in
situations where an examination of the vouchers could have disclosed
the forgery because the dishonest employee, after having forged the
payee's signature, had indorsed the checks in his own name? 1" 0 And
-- what is more important-should the rule be applied even in situa-
tions where the drawer could have discovered and prevented a whole
series of forgeries committed over an extended period by examining the
correctness of checks prepared by his employee, by comparing the
vouchers, as to amount and payees, with books and other records kept
in the office? Should not the drawee-bank, in situations of this kind, be
allowed to debit the drawer's account with at least the amount of those
checks of the whole series which were forged after the forgery of the
held that the plaintiff's negligence in not ascertaining the genuineness of the indorse-
ment was offset by the negligence of the banks, which had a similar duty.
108. Kleinman v. Chase National Bank v. City of New York, 124 Misc. 173, 207
N. Y. Supp. 191 (Sup. Ct. 1925); (1925) 38 HARv. L. REv. 679; (1925) 25 CoL. L.
REv. 668 (the drawees notified the drawee-bank two years after he had received the
statement of account and the vouchers covering this transaction). Atwell v. Mercantile
Trust Co. of Calif., 95 Cal. App. 338 (1928), (1929) 17 CAUF. L. REv. 308, 2 So.
CAUF. L. REV. 387. For further references see BRANNAN, NGo-rIAnL INsTRUMENTS
LAW (5th ed. 1932) 1098. Contra: Union Tool Co. v. the Farmers and Merchants
National Bank of Los Angeles, 192 Cal. 40, 218 Pac. 424 (1923); but cf. Merchants
National Bank of Los Angeles v. Continental Bank, 98 Cal. App. 523, 277 Pac. 354
(1929).
109. Shipman v. Bank of State of New York, 126 N. Y. 318, 27 N. E. 371; BRADY
oN BANKC CHEcKs (2d ed. 1929).
110. The court in National Surety Co. v. President and Directors of Manhattan Co.
[252 N. Y. 247, 169 N. E. 372 (1929)] apparently considered this circumstance as
irrelevant. But see Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. National Bank of Com-
merce in New York, 227 N. Y. 510, 125 N. E. 681 (1920); Pannonia Building & Loan
Association v. West Side Trust Co., 93 N. J. L. 377, 108 Atl. 240 (1919).
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prior checks could have been discovered? The courts have given no uni-
form answer.'1
The New York courts and many others following their example have
carried far the principle that the drawer-customer has a right to assume
that the drawee-bank, before paying, will ascertain the genuineness of
indorsements. They have allowed the drawer to rely on the honesty and
faithfulness of his employees, provided the latter had given no reason
for suspicion, and they have not regarded the drawer's failure to check
the correctness of the checks as negligent; in jurisdictions taking this
view efforts of the defendant bank to get to the jury the question of the
plaintiff's negligence have been unsuccessful, for these courts have been
inclined to direct the verdict in the plaintiff's favor."' Even where the
drawer's blind confidence had to be called negligence, some courts have
still allowed recovery because they did not regard this negligence as the
proximate cause of the drawee-bank's loss." Their reaction, however,
has been different in instances where the defendant was able to fortify
his defense by alleging and proving that the drawer had reason for not
trusting his employee.
The play of rule and counterrule is well illustrated by the decision of
the Michigan Supreme Court in Detroit Piston Ring Company v. Wayne
County and Home Savings Bank. Here, a dishonest payroll clerk of the
drawer, a manufacturing corporation of some size, had inserted on the
payroll the names of former employees and fictitious names, prepared
checks to their order, and presented them to one of the officials of the
corporation who signed them without examination of their correctness.
After having forged the indorsements of the purported payees, she cashed
these spurious checks, which were marked as payroll checks, with another
bank and continued this scheme for a period of more than two and
one-half years, forging some 570 checks for about $28,000. To cover
up the fraud, the dishonest employee increased the company's cost ac-
count. Since this increase in the cost of production could not be accounted
111. (1935) 99 A. L. R. 426, 439; Comment (1935) 33 MxcH. L. REv. 758.
112. Welsh v. German-American Bank, 73 N. Y. 424 (1873); Shipman v. Bank
of State of New York, 126 N. Y. 318, 27 N. E. 371 (1891) ; Detroit Piston Ring Co.
v. Wayne County and Home Savings Bank, 252 Mich. 163, 233 N. NV. 185 (1930);
Marsh Co. v. Shawmut Bank, 201 Mass. 397, 87 N. E. 740 (1909).
113. Welsh v. German-American Batk, 10 J. & S. 462, aff'd, 73 N. Y. 424 (1878);
Detroit Piston Ring Co. v. Wayne County and Home Savings Bank, 252 Mich. 163,
233 N. W. 185 (1930). Contra: Fletcher National Bank v. Crescent Paper Co., 193
Ind. 329, 139 N. E. 664 (1923). Here the court held that it .was for the jury to
determine whether or not the depositor was negligent in failing to examine indorse-
ments where the checks were drawn by a clerk to fictitious payees, or to a person to
whom the depositor was not indebted and with whom he had done no business for
eight months. See also, Kaszab v. Greenebaunm Bank & T. Co., 252 Ill. App. 107 (1929).
114. Los Angeles Ins. Co. v. House Savings Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 182 Pac. 293 (1919);
Marsh Co. v. Shawmut Nat. Bank, 201 Mass. 397, 87 N. E. 740 (1909).
1981 889
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
for, auditors were employed, but no audit was made of the payroll, and
the irregularities were not detected. If the exact working time of each
employee had been ascertained by comparing the payroll with the em-
ployee's time card, the fraud would have been discovered immediately.
It was finally discovered in this manner. In the suit by the drawer
against his bank to recredit his account, the Michigan Supreme Court
denied that the company had an absolute duty to compare the returned
checks with the employment or time cards."; The officers of the company
were said to have a right to rely upon the honesty and faithfulness of
the clerk whom they had no reason to suspect of dishonesty. But the
court conceded that as soon as the knowledge of the increased cost of
production was brought home to the management due care might have
required the type of comparison that was eventually made, and, there-
fore, reversing a judgment based on a directed verdict in plaintiff's
favor, granted a new trial.
A similar attitude was taken by the New York Court of Appeals in
Prudential Insurance Co. v. National Bank of Commerce, a case involving
the applicability of the rule to another typical situation."' In this case
the plaintiff insurance company drew two checks upon the defendant
bank payable to two policy holders and sent them to the plaintiff's agent
for delivery to the payees. The plaintiff knew that previous checks sent
to the agent had not been received by the payees. The agent forged the
indorsements of the payees, indorsing his own name, deposited the checks
in a bank which collected them from the defendant, and the agent con-
verted the proceeds. The trial court directed a verdict for the plaintiff, but
this was reversed because evidence should have been submitted to the jury
on the issue of whether the plaintiff was precluded from setting up the
forgeries by reason of its negligence in not discovering the agent's prior
misconduct or informing the defendant of reasons for special caution.
In order to prevent forgeries of pay checks, so frequent a practice in
recent years, some business enterprises and their banks have resorted to
a system of self-protection. Payroll checks were designed which were
not only marked on their face as such, but bore in addition the time clock
number of the employees, indicating the number of working hours of
each employee. But, despite these precautions, many of these payroll
checks bore forged indorsements and were paid by the drawee-bank. Must
the bank still bear the loss or can it rely on the apparent regularity of
these payroll checks? In Ericson Co. v. Iowa National Bank, the Iowa
115. Detroit Piston Ring Co. v. Wayne County and Home Savings Bank, 252 Mich.
163, 233 N. W. 185 (1930). The court cited as an authority: Paton v. Guaranty Trust
Co., 227 App. Div. 545, 238 N. Y. Supp. 362 (1930); cf. National Bank of Commerce
of Tacoma v. Tacoma Mill Co., 182 Fed. 1, 12 (C. C. A. 9th, 1910).
116. 227 N. Y. 510, 125 N. E. 681 (1920).
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Supreme Court has answered this question in favor of the bank. t In
this case the protective scheme broke down because the checks, prepared
by a dishonest employee as payable to former employees, were signed by
an officer of the plaintiff, who blindly relying on the employee's honesty,
did nothing to check the accuracy of the prepared checks. "These repre-
sentations of fact made on the face of the check," the court held, "might
reasonably be relied upon by the drawee, and, if, when so relied on, they
reasonably tended to relax further investigation on the part of the drawee
for its own protection, then he worked an estoppel against the plaintiff."
The court further argued that "if the drawee-bank, in paying the check,
reasonably believed that the payee was a present employee, it might also
reasonably believe that the indorsement was genuine."1"0
Looking back, we find that, at least on the surface, the drawee-bank
has generally received a rough deal at the hands of the courts. But is this
really true? In many of the cases there are indications that one of the
reasons why the courts did not hesitate to allow recovery from the bank
was that the customer's behavior had caused no damages to the drawee-
bank, since the latter had a remedy over against the recipient."' There-
fore, to understand the attitude of the courts fully, we should take into
account the fact that the liability of the drawee-bank to its depositors is
closely tied up with the liability of the recipient to the drawee-bank. This
leads us to a more detailed investigation of the relationship between the
drawee-bank and the recipient.
In suits by the drawee-bank against the recipient, the problem of the
relevancy of the negligence of the drawer-depositor in facilitating the
forgery by non-discovery has played an important role. The recurrent
defense of the recipient has been that in such a situation the drawee-banr,
due to the drawer's negligence, is under no duty to recredit his account
and that, therefore, the drawee ought not to have the equitable action for
money had and received against the recipient. This defense has generally
been refused. The courts have relied on the argument that there is
no privity between drawer and collecting bank and that, therefore, the
drawer owed to that bank no duty of vigilance." ° This position has been
117. 211 Iowa 495, 230 N. IV. 342 (1931). A further additional factor in favor
of the drawee bank was that the protection of an insurance carried by it to cover such
losses had been lost by the delay in discovery. See further Defiance Lumber Co. v.
Bank of California, 180 Wash. 533, 41 P. (2d) 135 (1935) ; Thomas v. Standard Acci-
dent Insurance Co. of Detroit, 7 Fed. Supp. 205 (E. D. Mich. 1934). But cf. City
of New York v. Bronx County Dress Co., 261 N. Y. 64, 184 N. E. 495 (1933), (1933)
11 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rxv. 101.
118. This argument has been criticized in American Sash & Door Co. v. Commerce
Trust Co., 56 S. NV. (2d) 1034 (Mo. 1932).
119. Infra, note 121.
120. National Surety Co. v. President and Directors of Manhattan Co., 252 N. Y.
247, 169 N. E. 372 (1929); American Exchange National Bank v. Yorkville Bank,
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fortified by resorting to the picture that "the collecting bank, in taking
and collecting checks from the drawee-bank, relies not on anything done
by the drawer but solely on the credit and the responsibility of the prior
indorser ;" a few courts have even moved in a circle, arguing that despite
the drawer-depositor's negligence, the drawee-bank was still liable to the
drawer-depositor since it had suffered no damage by the latter's negligence,
inasmuch as the drawee-bank had a remedy over against the recipient.1 21
The policy behind the numerous decisions on this point is qhite clear:
The courts want to force every indorser to fall back on his pre-
decessor "until the wrongdoer is finally made to pay. 1 22 It is, therefore,
not surprising that the efforts of the recipient to compel the drawee-bank
to interpose the defense of negligence in a suit by the drawer against
the drawee-bank have been without success; the drawee-bank has been
allowed to forego this defense either because it believed no such defense
existed, or because it wished to waive it and rely on the remedy over
against the recipient." z An interesting illustration of such a case is
Sprague v. West Hudson County Trust Co.124 Here a check bearing the
forged indorsement of the payee was paid by the drawee-bank to the re-
cipient. On discovery the latter filed a bill in equity against the drawee
praying that it be enjoined from crediting the account of the drawer "until
a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that the defendant bank
is legally liable." The petition was based on the fact that the forgeries
had been committed by employees of the drawer and could have been
stopped long before the petitioner cashed the checks by ordinary dili-
gence in inspecting the returned vouchers and bank statements. But the
petition was denied because there was no privity between drawer and re-
cipient and, therefore, no duty of care owed by the latter to the former.
Whether the court meant that a drawer did not owe a duty of care to
a recipient in every case is difficult to -say, since the petitioners them-
selves, who had cashed the instruments under somewhat peculiar cir-
122 Misc. 616, 204 N. Y. Supp. 621, aff'd, 206 N. Y. Supp. 679 (Sup. Ct. 1924);
Fallick v. Amalgamated Bank of New York, 232 App. Div. 127, 249 N. Y. Supp. 238
(1st Dep't 1931) ; Second National Bank of Pittsburg v. Guaranty Saving and Deposit
Co. of Shamokin, 206 Pa. 616, 56 Atl. 72 (1903).
121. American Exchange National Bank v. Yorkville Bank, 122 Misc. 616, 214
N. Y. Supp. 621 (1924), aff'd, 216 N. Y. Supp. 679 (Sup. Ct. 1924); cf. Critten v.
Chemical Bank, 171 N. Y. 219, 63 N. E. 969 (1902); Kearny v. Metropolitan Bank,
110 App. Div. 236, 97 N. Y. Supp. 274 (1st Dep't 1905), aff'd, 186 N. Y. 611, 79 N. E.
1108 (1,906). In many cases the collecting bank had given a guarantee of prior indorse-
ments.
122. Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Harriman National Bank & Trust Co., 146 Misc.
551, 262 N. Y. Supp. 482 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
123. Fallick v. Amalgamated Bank of New York, 232 App. Div. 127, 249 N. Y.
Supp. 238 (1st Dep't 1931).
124. 92 N. J. Eq. 638 (1921).
[Vol. 47:86
FORGED INDORSEMENTS
cumstances, -were apparently not free from blame. Under these decisions
the drawee-bank seems to be safe in recrediting voluntarily the drawer's
account on the latter's sufficient showing of the forgery of an indorse-
ment and in relying on its remedy over against the recipient, at least if
the latter has given a guarantee of the genuineness of all prior indorse-
ments.
These decisions, particularly those rendered by New York courts,
which fail to impose on the drawer a duty of guarding a subsequent
purchaser against the danger of a forgery of the payee's signature, are
in accord with a line of decisions which deny that the drawer or in-
dorser owes to a subsequent purchaser a duty of care to protect him
against wrongful filling of blank spaces." Yet even the New York
courts could have decided in favor of subsequent purchasers, as some
of the negligent mailing and imposter cases show. Slattery and Co. v.
City Bank is particularly interesting in this respect.1 " Here a New York
brokerage firm drew a check payable to one H. E. Roberts, intending
to mail the same to its client by that name in Oklahoma, but instead
sent it by mistake to a former client of the same name in Texas. The
latter cashed it in a Texas bank which in turn discounted it with the
defendant bank. The defendant bank collected the check from the
drawee-bank. The plaintiff drawer, as assignee of the true payee, sued
the defendant bank for conversion. The court could have seized upon
the argument that because of the lack of privity the drawer'of a nego-
tiable instrument has no duty of care to a subsequent purchaser. Or it
could have treated the indorsement as a forgery and invoked the doctrine
of Mead v. Young since the recipient knew that he was not the in-
tended payee.a r Instead of so arguing, the court denied that there was
125. National Exchange Bank v. Lester, 194 N. Y. 461, 87 N. E. 779 (1909) (ac-
commodation indorser); Exchange National Bank of Spokane v. Bank of Little Rock,
58 Fed. 140 (C. C. A. Sth, 1893) ; Burrows v. Klunk, 70 Md. 451, 17 Ati. 378 (109) ;
cf. Greenfield Savings Bank v. Stowell, 123 Mass. 196 (189) (malzer). Contra:
Hackett v. First National Bank of Louisville, 114 Ky. 193, 70 S. XV. 660 (1902);
Yokum v. Smith, 63 IlL 321 (1872). More than a few courts distinguish between the
status of a bona fide purchaser and that of a dravee-bank, and allow the draee-bark
to debit the negligent drawer's account with the raised amount. Timble v. Garfield
Bank, 121 App. Div. 870, 106 N. Y. Supp. 497 (1907). See (1919) 4 Coa.'. L Q.
46; (1918) 31 HlAv. L. Rrv. 779.
126. 114 Misc. 48, 186 N. Y. Supp. 679 (1920), adversely criticized in (1921) 21
COL. L. REv. 576; (1921) 30 YAmI. L. J. 628. And cf. Market St. Title and Trust
Co. v. Chelton Trust Co., 296 Pa. 230, 145 AtI. 844 (192) ; (1924) 77 U. or PA. L.
REV. 1115. 'Contra: Thomas v. First National Bank of Gulfport, 101 Miss. 500, 5S
So. 478 (1911); Jones Bros. v. Citizens National Bank of Ogmulgee, 106 Olda. 162,
233 Pac. 472 (1923); Beattie v. National Bank of Illinois, 174 I1. 571, 51 N. E. 602
(1898).
127. Russell v. First National Bank, 2 Ala. App. 342, 56 So. 83 (1911); Beatty
v. National Bank of Illinois, 174 Ill. 571, 51 N. E. 602 (1893). The court could also
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a forgery because the drawer's original intent to make the check payable
to the Oklahoma Richards "was superseded and blotted out by the actual
delivery" to the Texas Richards. Furthermore, recognizing a duty of
care owed by the drawer to a subsequent purchaser, the court held that
the loss should fall upon the plaintiff through whose fault it occurred
rather than on the defendant who parted with money in good faith.12 8
A similar approach has frequently been taken in the imposter situa-
tion, i.e., cases where an imposter,- representing that he is a certain person,
fraudulently obtains an instrument made payable to the person who he
purports to be, and indorses the instrument with an assumed name. In
this situation courts liave frequently refused to regard the indorsement
of an imposter as a forgery because-as they said-the drawer actually
intended the imposter to acquire title to the instrument and to indorse
and collect it. They have thus implicitly recognized a duty of care on
the part of the drawer with respect to subsequent purchasers and the
drawee bank. As a result, the title of the subsequent purchaser has been
recognized and the drawee-bank has not been held liable to pay back
the proceeds and has been allowed to debit the drawer's account.12D These
cases show that it is not the lack of privity which prevented the courts
from protecting purchaser and drawee but rather that the denial of the
required privity was a rationalization of the courts which felt that the
equities in favor of a subsequent purchaser or the drawee were not strong
enough to set aside the general rule which protects the true owner and
the drawer. In this connection it is quite noteworthy that the Washington
Supreme Court in Defiance Lumber Company v. Bank of California,
another spurious payroll check case, used the analogy of the negligent
mailing and imposter cases to defeat the drawer's recovery from the
defendant drawee-bank thus indirectly protecting the recipients as well.1 30
have argued that the drawer's negligent mailing was not the proximate cause of the
purchaser's loss since the forgery-which could not reasonably have been anticipated-
had broken the chain of causation. Knoxville National Bank v. Clark, 51 Iowa 264
(1879); Socit6 G~nrale v. The Metropolitan Bank, 27 L. T. R. (x.s.) 849 (C. P.
1873).
128. Among other authorities the court relied upon Weisberger Company v. Bar-
berton Savings Bank, 84 Ohio St. 29, 95 N. E. 379 (1911), which involved an action
of the drawer against the drawee-bank under similar circumstances.
129. Robertson v. Coleman, 141 Mass. 231, 4 N. E. 619 (1886); Land Title and
Trust Company v. Northwestern National Bank, 196 Pa. 230, 46 AtI. 420 (1900);
Holub-Dusha Company v. Germania Bank, 164 App. Div. 279, 149 N. Y. Supp. 775
(1914). But cf. Strang v. Westchester County National Bank, 235 N. Y. 68 (1923);
Cohen v. Lincoln Savings Bank, 275 N. Y. 399, 10 N. E. (2d) 457 (1937), (1938)
7 FORDHAm L. REv. 106; (1938) 38 CoL L. Rev. 171. Contra: Toleman v. American
National Bank, 22 R. 1. 462, 48 Atl. 480 (1901). No exhaustive discussion of the
imposter cases and the distinctions made is here intended. See (1938) U. OF PA. L.
Rev. 526, 530; (1937) 7 BROOKLYN L. REV. 220.
130. 180 Wash. 533, 41 P. (2d) 135 (1935). For collection of cases, see note (1935)
99 A. L. R. 439 et seq. Cf. Central National Bank v. National Metropolitan Bank,
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IV.
After reaching the end of our travel through the labyrinth of the
Anglo-American law, we are now better prepared to appreciate the
simplicity of the continental law. But is not simplicity the only virtue
of its solution, and has not the Anglo-American, particularly the Amer-
ican, law complicated as it may be, merits which are completely lacking
in the continental law? The question permits no easy answer.
The main criticisms made by Anglo-American writers are two-fold.131
The first is that the continental solution restricts the issuance of bills.
But this is difficult to prove since no statistical evidence has been brought
forward of its delitorious effect. The little use made of checks in Germany
as compared with the United States seems to indicate, however, that
there is considerable truth in the assertion. The danger of loss con-
nected with the mailing of checks has caused a considerable fraction of
German debtors to use other and safer payment devices; they prefer to
pay by non-negotiable post checks. The other principal objection is that
the continental solution probably encourages laxity in bill transactions.
This may also be true. The continental law makes it fairly safe to buy
a negotiable paper from a stranger while the American law places upon
the purchaser the risk of a forged indorsement.
The fact that the English law has followed the continental example
to the extent of protecting a bona fide banker-drawee who pays a check
or other demand draft bearing a forged indorsement raises the further
problem of whether the distinction should be made between the bona
fide purchasers who do not deserve protection and bona fide payors, at
least if they are acceptors or drawees of checks. It has been argued in
favor of such a differentiation that the purchaser may choose the seller
of a negotiable paper and may turn down a suspicious offer while the
acceptor and drawee-bank have no such choice of payment or non-pay-
ment. 32 If the acceptor fails to pay and the indorsements prove genuine,
he exposes himself to a law-suit by the holder. If the drawee-bank
refuses to pay and the indorsements turn out to be genuine, the bank
exposes itself-it is said-to a liability to the drawer for slander of
credit. 3 ' On the other hand, if the drawee or acceptor pay, they do so
31 App. D. C. 391 (1908). That the intent theory is merely the rationalization of a
desired result has been recognized in Cohen v. Lincoln Savings Bank, 275 N. Y. 399
at 407, 10 N. E. (2d) 457 at 461 (1937).
131. Chalmers in LE&GuF OF NATIONS, UNIFICATION OF LA.ws RE.ATING TO BILS
OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES 103.
132. This has been done in the Continental literature. See KEssLm, VEscusmzcsrz
(1933) 79, 80; KESSLER, SCHCKGESZ (1934) 105 et seq. The GENEvA BI.s or
EXcHaANGE Acr differentiates in favor of the bona fide payor, Art. 16(2) ; 40(3).
133. DEBATES, CANADIAN HOUSE OF COMiONS (1890) 1077 et scq., 2 id., at 4405.
It is of interest that the efforts to incorporate into the Canadian Bills of Exchange
Act of 1890 a provision parallel to Section 60 of the English Bills of Exchange Act
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at their own risk. This dilemma is a real one, however, only so far as
the acceptor is concerned and thus far the wisdom of the Anglo-American
law is problematical. But these arguments in favor of protecting the
drawee-bank are not convincing. First, there is no authority for the
contention that a bank which refuses to honor a check because it suspects
a forged indorsement exposes itself to liability for slander of credit.
All of the cases establishing such a liability concern the entirely
different situation where a drawee-bank refuses to honor checks either
wilfully or negligently because it mistakenly believes that the drawer
has insufficient funds with the bank. Secondly, since most banks pay
a check over the counter only after the recipient has given adequate identi-
fication of himself, the remedy over against the recipient is not an empty
right. Furthermore, the majority of checks are presented through clear-
ing houses with a guarantee of prior indorsements which enables the
drawee-bank to make a safe payment. Finally, we have seen that in many
cases it is not the drawee-bank which suffers the loss resulting from a
forged indorsement, for the drawee-bank has a remedy over against the
recipient. Thus.the burden ultimately falls upon the person who acquires
from the forger, very often the bank which cashes for the forger or his
accomplice.
Still a stronger point to be made in favor of the American solution
is the fact that it has had the effect of compelling the American banks
to carry insurance against forged indorsements. It would seem to be easier
for the bank than it is for an individual drawer or holder of negotiable
paper to carry such insurance and to distribute the expense among all
its customers. From an economic point of view, the American solution
is therefore sounder in principle than the continental law. But the rigidity
of the American law becomes problematical in cases where employees of
large business concerns have committed forgeries which could have been
prevented by a proper supervision and which were discovered so laie that
have failed. As a result of the opposition, the original counterpart to Section 60 of
the Bills of Exchange Act was dropped and the sole modification made in the existing
law was that the drawer of a check forfeits his rights to have the drawee-bank recredit
his account if he fails to inform the drawee-bank in writing of a discovered forgery
within one year after he has acquired notice. Canadian Bills of Exchange Act, § 49(1)
(b). As to the situation in Australia and South Africa, both of which have sections
identical with Section 60 of the Bills of Exchange Act, see BYv.as oxr Ba.s (19th ed.
1931).
In the United States, judging by the answers to a questionnaire sent by Professor
Steffen, there is "scarcely any support whatever, even among the bankers, for the
English rule." Turner, A Factual Analysis of Certain Proposed Amendments to the
Negotiable Instruments Law (1929) 38 YALF L. J. 1047, at 1051. The apathy of the
banks is probably due to the fact that they are involved as often in the role of drawee
as they are in that of recipient.
[Vol. 47: 863
1938] FORGED INDORSEMENTS 897
they were no longer covered-by the forgery insurance.1"' There is no
reason why a business concern should not be compelled to insure itself
against such a loss. Furthermore, the wisdom of the Anglo-American
solution is also doubtful in cases where the purchaser who has to suffer
is not a bank which can carry insurance but an individual purchaser who
innocently cashes a forged negotiable instrument. In such a case it would
be more equitable to distribute the loss on a basis of negligence and to
let the drawer or true owner who negligently handled the negotiable in-
strument bear the forgery loss rather than the non-negligent purchaser.
It is to be hoped that the Defiance Lumber case foreshadows a trend in
this direction. 35
134. Ericson Co. v. Iovwa National Bank, 211 Iowa 495, 230 NAV. 342 (1931).
135. 180 Wash. 533, 41 P. (2d) 135 (1935), discussed supra, page 894.
